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ABSTRACT
CONVERTING THREATS INTO OPPORTUNITIES
PREDICTING MEDICAL ERROR REPORTING BEHAVIOR
Whitney Thomas Rogers
April 20, 2020
Medical errors are a public health epidemic and a major threat to patient safety.
Estimates suggest they may be responsible for 210,000 - 440,000 preventable deaths per 
year. This would make medical errors the third leading cause of death in the United 
States. The societal burden of medical errors is steep, with the economic impact near $1
trillion. The purpose of this study was to use a theory-driven approach to better
understand the reporting behavior of healthcare professional. Increased error reporting 
leads to heightened awareness of the precursors or conditions generating errors, which 
can then be corrected. In its most simplistic view, reporting is tool used towards the 
prevention of medical errors.
A health care marketing firm was hired to recruit 106 health care professionals to
complete a survey on their intention to report medical errors. Random and anonymous 
sampling techniques were employed to help mitigate the risk associated with answering 
questions that may be risky and lead to social desirability bias. Regression model 
statistics were statistically significant in explaining 53.3% of the variance in intention 
vii
scores, R2 = .533, F(8, 69) = 9.86, p <. 001.  Constructs of behavioral attitude (β = .537,
p = .001), perceived behavioral control (β = .594, p = .002), and actual behavioral control 
(β = 1.25, p = .005), contributed significantly to the model statistics.  Psychological 
safety was not a significant predictor of intention.
These findings suggest psychological safety may be redundant with the theory’s 
existing predictors, working through one or more of the theory constructs. Developing 
novel strategies for improving the reporting behavior of health care providers, targeting
behavioral attitude and perceived behavioral control, will be essential in safeguarding the 
health of the public through the reduction of medical errors.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Summary of the Problem
Primum non nocere “first do no harm” is a fundamental maxim of medical 
education. Although this well-known aphorism is often referenced (erroneously) as part 
of the Hippocratic Oath, it contains a concise and forcefully expressive general truth.  
One area in which the healthcare system fails to uphold this truism is the capacity to 
protect patients from harm due to medical errors. Medical errors are a public health 
epidemic and a major threat to patient safety. Some estimates suggest medical errors 
could be the third leading cause of death in the United States (Makary & Daniel, 2016).
In their groundbreaking To Err is Human report, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) decreed 
the epidemic of medical errors a result of unsafe systems, not reckless or incompetent 
individuals (1999). Recommendations to create safer systems included the 
implementation of voluntary and mandatory error reporting systems.
Efforts to increase error reporting by health care professionals have been 
unsuccessful, with widespread paucity of reporting. In 2012, the Health and Human 
Service’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) released a report on hospital incident
reporting systems and patient harm. Their analysis of Medicare beneficiaries found 86
2
percent of errors were not reported to hospital incident reporting systems (Levinson, 
2012). The OIG’s report listed lack of education (type of errors that should be reported)
and inconsistent application of reporting protocols by employees as key contributing 
factors. A later study on the implementation of an error reporting system suggested 
underreporting in health care may be closer to 90 percent (Anderson & Abrahamson, 
2017).
It is widely accepted that medicine is a complex healing art, in which doctors 
enter into an implicit social contract with their patients. In return, medicine is granted the
privilege of self-regulation. Self-regulation is part of the ideology of medical 
professionalism and requires an ethical obligation to keep its members from harming 
society. Reporting is at the cornerstone of these efforts. However, the data suggest the 
profession has been not been successful in honoring this part of the contract (Shojania, 
Duncan, McDonald, & Wachter, 2001). If interventions are not successful in improving 
the reporting behavior of health care professionals, then alternative approaches to
regulation are needed.
The barriers to reporting are complex. In a post-IOM follow-up report asking why 
health care was not safer, cultural barriers (the culture of medicine) was cited as the 
primary reason for the lack of progress (Leape & Berwick, 2005). Fear of individual 
blame, repercussions, liability, and litigation were given as explanations for not reporting. 
This problem is perpetuated by a deep-seated power structure and a ‘blame and shame’ 
culture. Individuals who do not feel safe in their environment will not speak freely about 
sensitive issues such as errors (Derickson, Fishman, Osatuke, Teclaw, & Ramsel, 2015).
3
A term coined by Edmondson, psychological safety refers to “a shared belief by members 
of a team that the team is safe for interpersonal risk taking” (Edmondson, 1999, p. 350).
Purpose of Study
The broad purpose of this study was to better understand medical error reporting 
behavior in a random sample of health care professionals licensed in the state of 
Kentucky. A simplistic view towards the prevention of medical errors is that heightened 
awareness identifies the mechanisms generating error that can then be corrected. 
Data were collected and analyzed using sequential explanatory design (Creswell, 
Plano Clark, Gutmann, & Hanson, 2003). In the first sequence, quantitative methods 
were used to predict reporting behavior using a survey instrument designed to capture the 
constructs of the theory of planned behavior (TPB). The relationship between the 
antecedents of behavior (attitude towards behavior, subjective norms, perceived 
behavioral control) and the intention to report medical errors (a proxy for behavior when 
observing actual behavior is difficult) were modeled using regression techniques.
Psychological safety was added to the model to assess additional explained variance in 
intention scores.
In the second sequence, responses to case studies were used to “help explain, or
elaborate on, results obtained in the first phase” (Ivankova, Creswell, & Stick, 2006, p. 
5). Specifically, responses to the case study scenarios were used to calculate an
alternative measure of intention, defined as intention simulation. Intention simulation is 
described in the Theory of Planned Behavior Questionnaire: Manual for Researchers as a
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“more valid proxy measure of actual behavior” when investigating behavior in health 
care professionals (Francis et al., 2004, p. 12). This method was designed to elicit
complex behavioral decisions based on the presentation of real clinical situations
believed to more accurately reflect actual behavior.
In this study, intention simulation was assessed using case studies taken from the
Patient Safety in Rural Healthcare Settings study (Cook, Hoas, Guttmannova, & Joyner, 
2004). Participants were asked to read six scenarios and make a reporting decision based 
on the information provided. Measures of intention simulation and generalized intention 
(collected in the first sequence) were then compared. By capitalizing on the strengths of 
each approach, these methods provided a robust analysis of the contextual factors that
motivate individual behavior (Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 
1998). Understanding the factors which both facilitate and inhibit reporting behavior, 
including the intention to report, is critical to the overall goal of reducing medical errors.
The research questions and corresponding hypotheses for this study are:
Research Question 1(a) – What is the relationship between attitude towards 
behavior, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control and the intention to 
report medical errors?
Hypothesis 1: The theory of planned behavior will significantly predict 
the intention to report medical errors. 
Research Question 1(b) – Does the inclusion of additional variables in an 
expanded theory of planned behavior model explain additional variance in 
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intention scores?
Hypothesis 2: Inclusion of background variables, past reporting behavior, 
and actual behavioral control will significantly predict intention scores. 
Research Question 2(a) – What is the relationship between psychological safety 
and the intention to report?
Hypothesis 1: Psychological safety will be a significant predictor of the 
intention to report medical errors.
Research Question 2(b) – What is the relationship between TPB antecedents of 
behavior, psychological safety, and the intention to report medical errors?
Hypothesis 2: The inclusion of psychological safety as an additional 
predictor variable in the theory of planned behavior will significantly 
improve explanatory power of the model.
Research Question 2(c) – Does the inclusion of psychological safety in an 
expanded model explain additional variance in intention scores?
Hypothesis 3: Inclusion psychological safety as an additional predictor 
variable in an expanded model of the TPB will significantly predict 
intention scores.
Research Question 3 – How does psychological safety influence the intention to 
report?
Hypothesis 1: Psychological safety will independently influence the 
6
intention to report.
Research Question 4 – Can an alternative measure of intention better 
approximate actual behavior?
Hypothesis 1: Intention simulation will serve as a better proxy for actual 
behavior than generalized intention in predicting error reporting behavior.
7
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Medical Errors
Defining medical errors is as complex as the environment in which they occur, 
with most definitions’ dependent on the context in which they are being studied. The
most commonly cited definition originates from the Institute of Medicine (IOM), which 
defines medical errors as “the failure of a planned action to be completed as intended (an 
error of execution) or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim (an error of planning)”
(IOM, 1999; Reason, 1990).
Lucian Leape, physician and professor who published the classic Harvard 
Medical Practice Study (HMPS), defined medical errors as an “unintended act (omission 
or commission) or one that does not achieve its intended outcome” (Leape, 1994, p. 
1851). Errors of commission result from action, either in the planning or execution stage,
and errors of omission result from a failure to act. As defined by the authors of the 
HMPS, adverse events are “injuries caused by medical management”, rather than events 
caused by an underlying disease (Brennan et al., 1991, p. 370). To clarify, all negative 
outcomes are not the result of medical errors (Uribe, Schweikhart, Pathak, Dow, &
Marsh, 2002), and errors that do not result in negative outcomes or adverse events are 
called near misses (Firth-Cozens, 2002). However, adverse events that do result from 
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medical errors are referred to as preventable adverse events. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) describes errors as incidents or “any deviation from usual care that 
imposes an injury to the patient or creates a risk of harm; including preventable adverse 
events and hazards” (WHO, 2005a). The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ) describes them simply as events (AHRQ, July 2013). The lack of standardized 
nomenclature and taxonomy, overlapping terms, and surrogate measures make it difficult
to obtain epidemiological measures, identify root causes, and develop effective solutions 
(Grober & Bohnen, 2005).
Magnitude and Public Health Significance
The problem of medical errors was brought to the attention of the world in 1999 
when the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published the landmark report, To Err is Human:
Building a Safer Health System and revealed that medical errors were responsible for 
between 44,000 and 98,000 preventable deaths every year (IOM, 1999). These estimates 
were based on the results of the first epidemiological study of medical errors conducted,
the Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS).
In 1984, the HMPS sought to obtain epidemiological data on adverse events and 
negligence in a New York hospital population (Brennan et al., 1991). In this study, 
adverse events were defined as “injury caused by medical management that prolonged 
hospitalization or resulted in disability” and negligence as “care not meeting the industry 
standards” (Brennan et al., 1991, p. 145). The HMPS reviewed over 30,000 hospital 
records and produced an incidence rate of 3.7 percent for adverse events and 27.6 percent
for negligence. Although most adverse events resulted in minor impairment (56.8
9
percent), 14 percent of these events resulted in death. When applied to the population of 
New York, the study concluded that over 13,000 deaths were related to adverse events 
(Brennan et al., 1991). Using the HMPS data, the IOM extrapolated these estimates to the 
nearly 33.6 million hospitalizations nationwide and concluded over 180,000 individuals 
in the United States die each year due to injury resulting directly from medical care. The
magnitude of this problem is equivalent to “three jumbo-jet crashes every two days” 
(Leape, 1994, p. 1851).
Further epidemiological studies suggest the problem of medical errors is much 
greater than what was reported by the IOM. In 2000, data assessing the incidence of 
adverse events and negligence in Colorado and Utah hospitals were published (Thomas et 
al., 2000). Utilizing similar methodology to the HMPS, researchers evaluated over 14,700 
discharge records from 1992 across 90 hospitals in Colorado and 53 in Utah. Study
investigators found adverse events were detected in nearly 3 percent of hospitalizations in 
both states (Thomas et al., 2000). These results were similar to the incidence and types of 
adverse events found in New York by the HMPS. 
A more recent evidence-based assessment of patient harm concluded the problem 
to be worse, with estimates between 210,000 and 440,000 preventable deaths per year 
related to adverse events (James, 2013). In this study, James (2013) systematically 
reviewed medical records using the Global Trigger Tool (GTT) to capture triggers or 
clues that a PAE had occurred. Utilizing this methodology, PAEs accounted for an
overall death rate of 0.89 percent. Among all adverse events, the percentage of PAEs was
69 percent across all studies (James, 2013, p. 125). Given the 34.4 million hospital 
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discharges in 2007, James (2013) concluded 210,000 preventable deaths were related to 
PAEs, an estimate that did not account for undocumented errors, errors missed by 
measurement tools, and errors of failing to make a life-saving diagnosis. An earlier study 
by Weisman et al., (2008) had also revealed serious problems with undocumented errors 
in medical records and suggested a multiplier be applied to account for these factors.
Although Weissman et al. (2008) suggested a threefold increase, James (2013) chose a 
more conservative factor of two. Using this formula, it was estimated over “440,000 
preventable adverse events contribute to the death of patients each year from care in 
hospitals” (James, 2013, p. 127).
Ultimately, these statistics suggest death by PAE, or medical errors, is the third
leading cause of death in the United States (U.S.) behind heart disease (647,457) and 
cancer (599,108). According to the 2017 vital statistics report released by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics (2019) the next 
closest cause of death is accidents/ unintentional injury (169,936), followed by chronic
lower respiratory disease (160,201). Even using the more conservative estimates cited in 
the IOM (1999), medical errors are the seventh (98,000 deaths per year) or eleventh
(44,000 deaths per year) leading cause of death in the United States.
Global Problem
Patient safety and medical errors are not unique to the United States. Estimates 
from a detailed review of 1000 case files in two London hospitals found 10 percent of all 
hospital admissions resulted in an adverse event, 5.2 percent of which were PAEs
(Vincent, Neale, & Woloshynowych, 2001). Extrapolating these figures across the 15.1 
11
million hospital admissions reported by National Health Service (NHS) in England from 
2012-2013 resulted in estimates of approximately 755,000 PAEs (Economics, 2014).
The Australian health system also reported a “silent epidemic” of errors. With 
18,000 deaths and 50,000 permanent injuries attributable to medical errors, 
approximately 1 in 6 (16.6 percent) of patients in Australian hospitals have been reported 
to suffer adverse or harmful events (Robinson et al., 2002; WHO, 2005b). Canada, New 
Zealand, and Denmark are also facing challenges with medical errors, making this a 
global public health issue. In 2002 during the 55th World Health Assembly, WHO
designated patient safety as a public health priority and established a World Alliance for 
Patient Safety. WHO member states were urged to promote safety as a “fundamental 
principle of all health systems” out of concern that the incidence of adverse events was “a 
challenge to quality of care, a significant cause of human suffering, and a high toll in 
financial loss and opportunity cost” (WHO, 2002, p. 1).
Societal Burden
The societal burden of medical errors is steep and rising. In 1989, the annual cost 
attributed to medical injuries (total health and productivity loss) in a New York State 
hospital was estimated to be $878 million (Johnson et al., 1992). In 1996, a similar study 
conducted in hospitals across Utah and Colorado found costs attributable to adverse 
events (additional medical expenses and lost productivity) to be $662 million, of which 
$308 million were directly related to medical errors (Thomas et al., 1999). When these 
figures were extrapolated to all U.S. hospital admissions, the annual costs were projected 
at $37.6 billion for adverse events and $17 billion for medical errors. Using 2008 
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population data and estimates from the 1989 New York State study, the cost of medical 
injuries were projected at nearly $50 billion (Van Den Bos et al., 2011).
Until recently, the annual economic impact of medical errors in the U.S. was in
the range of $17 to 50 billion using the methodology described above. However, a 2010
study sponsored by the Society for Actuaries and conducted by an independent actuarial 
and consulting firm (Milliman) found the economic impact of preventable medical errors 
may be closer to $1 trillion when quality-adjusted life years (QALY) were taken into 
account (Andel, Davidow, Hollander, & Moreno, 2012). The authors present a best-case
scenario using IOM estimates of 98,000 preventable deaths, with an average of 10 “lost 
life” years at a rate of $75,000 to $100,000 per year. Using these conservative 
parameters, Andel et al. (2012) estimated $73.5 to $98 billion loss from QALYs lost. 
Acknowledging the IOM estimates may be grossly understated, with some reports 
suggesting deaths due to medical errors could be 10 times higher than reported, the 
authors suggest the economic impact or burden of medical errors may, in actuality, be 
closer to $735 to $980 billion annually.
The societal burden of medical errors is a shared global problem. Data from the 
United Kingdom (UK) also suggest a significant economic impact due to medical errors.  
A 2014 report prepared by Frontier Economics for the National Health Service (NHS)
explored the cost of unsafe care. Using extrapolation, they reported an annual cost of £2.5 
billion related to PAEs, most of which were related to medication errors (Economics, 
2014).
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Etiology of Errors
The etiology of medical errors is complex (Alsafi et al., 2011; Poorolajal, Rezaie, 
& Aghighi, 2015) and errors are inevitable in certain systems (Perrow, 1994). Humans 
are inherently error-prone, and healthcare delivery systems are fragmented and complex.
The convergence of these factors creates the conditions that make errors more likely to 
occur. There are many types of errors that can occur during the course of delivering 
health care, ranging from widely publicized cases, such as Willie King’s incorrect 
surgery site that resulted in a wrong leg amputation (R. I. Cook, Woods, & Miller, 1998),
to lesser publicized errors resulting in falls, burns, hospital-acquired infections, pressure 
ulcers, and medication errors (IOM, 1999). Unlike errors that occur in other high-risk 
industries (e.g., Nuclear Power/Three Mile Island; Aviation/Challenger Mission), medical 
errors occur at the individual level and rarely make newspaper headlines.  
The IOM adopted a classification system based on Leape’s HMPS that
categorized errors into groups based on the type of error, such as diagnostic, treatment, 
preventive, or other (Leape, Lawthers, Brennan, & Johnson, 1993). Diagnostic errors 
include “delays in diagnosis; failure to employ indicated tests; use of outdated tests or 
therapy; and failure to act on results on monitoring or testing” (IOM, 1999, p. 36; Leape 
et al., 1993). Treatment errors encompass “error in the performance of an operation, 
procedure or test; error in administering the treatment; error in the dose or methods of 
using a drug; avoidable delay in treatment or in responding to an abnormal test; and 
inappropriate (not indicated) care” (IOM, 1999, p. 36; Leape et al., 1993). Preventive 
errors cover “failure to provide prophylactic treatment and inadequate monitoring or 
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follow-up treatment” (IOM, 1999, p. 36; Leape et al., 1993). Other errors combine 
“failures of communication; equipment failure; and other system failures” (IOM, 1999, p. 
36; Leape et al., 1993).
Within each category arise errors associated with misuse and overuse (i.e., errors 
of commission) and underuse (i.e., errors of omission) of medical care. Errors of 
omission pose a risk of preventable death through suboptimal care, while errors of 
commission pose risk from interventions that failed to achieve their expected outcomes or
those that were simply the wrong intervention (Hayward, Asch, Hogan, & et al., 2005).
Errors of commission include injuries resulting from improper execution and planning of 
treatment. James Reason, a pioneer in the field of human error, described these as errors 
of execution and errors of planning (Reason, 1990). A planned action that does not 
proceed as intended is considered an error of execution and encompasses terms such as 
slips and lapses. Errors of planning involve mistakes, where the action selected was 
wrong, and therefore cannot achieve its intended outcome (IOM, 1999).
According to Normal Accident Theory, the majority of accidents (between 60 and
80 percent) in any industry involve human error and are preventable (Perrow, 1994). The 
HMPS found over 70 percent of errors were preventable, with most occurring in highly 
technical surgical subspecialties and complex environments, such as emergency 
departments, operating rooms, and intensive care units (Leape et al., 1993). A study of 
adverse events in hospitals across Utah and Colorado found 52.6 percent of preventable 
errors occurred in emergency departments (Thomas et al., 2000). A September 2019 
patient safety update from WHO reported that one out of every 10 patients treated in 
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high-income countries experience harm as a direct result of being hospitalized, of which 
50 percent were preventable. Globally, the problem is much worse in low- and middle-
income countries, where rates of preventable harm are closer to 80 percent (WHO, 2019).
There are numerous ways in which human error contributes to preventable
accidents. Reason describes active errors as those that occur at the operator level or are 
directly controlled by the operator (Reason, 1990). Active, also known as sharp-end
errors, typically have a direct and immediate impact (R. I. Cook et al., 1998). A pilot 
crashing a plane or a surgeon amputating the wrong leg are examples of active errors
(IOM, 1999). Unlike active errors, latent, or blunt-end, errors occur outside of the control 
of the operator (R. I. Cook et al., 1998). Latent errors are frequently related to defects or 
malfunctions in equipment or organizational processes and often go undetected. In
aviation, one example of a latent error is a design flaw that gives rise to steering 
misalignment of an aircraft. Latent errors receive the least amount of attention and have 
the potential to cause the most damage, as they often remain in the system undetected, 
giving rise to numerous active errors (IOM, 1999). The IOM reported the investigation of 
the Challenger explosion found latent errors that had been present nine years before the 
accident.
In contrast to Natural Accident Theory, High-Reliability Theory states that 
“serious accidents with hazardous technologies can be can be prevented through 
intelligent organizational design and management” (Sagan, 1993, p. 2). This safety 
orientation is echoed in the IOM report, which concluded certain conditions create errors 
that go beyond individual responsibility (IOM, 1999). This systems approach to 
16
preventing errors and improving patient safety requires modification to the conditions 
that contribute to or create errors. Reason (1990) describes these as precursors or
preconditions. Precursors or conditions that lead to errors include latent factors such as 
work schedules, training, and properly working equipment.  
Managing Errors
Reporting is a means of identifying the precursors or preconditions to errors. It
provides information on where errors occur, the conditions under which their risk of 
occurrence is increased, and opportunities for improvements (Kronman, Paasche-Orlow, 
& Orlander, 2012). Once an error is identified, an analyst can identify the root causes 
(root cause analysis) or conditions leading up to the incident, so that corrective action
plans can be implemented. Without this type of formal data, opportunities to improve 
patient safety are hindered. Because reporting converts threats into learning opportunities 
(Poorolajal et al., 2015), it is a critical behavior in error management and fundamental to 
the broad goal of error reduction (Hartnell, MacKinnon, Sketris, & Fleming, 2012).
The IOM recommended both mandatory and voluntary error reporting to help 
reduce medical errors by 50 percent over five years (IOM, 1999). Mandatory reporting 
systems were recommended for serious adverse events, such as those resulting in severe
harm or death, and voluntary systems for those causing minimal harm, such as near 
misses. The most recent survey conducted by the National Academy for State Health 
Policy (NASHP) on compliance with the IOM recommendations found 27 states with
active (adverse event) reporting systems, one in the implementation stage, and 23 states 
verifying no active systems (Hanlon, Sheedy, Kniffin, & Rosenthal, 2015).
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Reporting and reporting systems are also a requirement of accreditation agencies,
such as Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JACHO), an
organization which certifies over 21,000 health care organizations and programs in the 
United States (The Joint Commission, 2020). These accreditations confer a commitment 
to quality and patient safety in health care and include robust reporting systems and 
supportive leadership. As outlined in JACHO’s Comprehensive Accreditation Manual for 
Hospitals, individuals in these organizations “recognize all patient safety events [from 
slips and near misses to serious adverse events resulting in death] must be reported”
(Patient Safety Chapter, 2017, p. 4). These standards are consistent with IOM
recommendations that reporting is critical to managing and preventing errors. Despite the 
emphasis on error reporting from both the IOM and major accreditation agencies, the
majority of errors go unreported (Appelbaum, Dow, Mazmanian, Jundt, & Appelbaum, 
2016).
Underreporting
Underreporting is a substantial problem undermining efforts to eliminate medical 
errors (Antonow, Smith, & Silver, 2000; Gunn, 2000; Wu, 2000). Underreporting of 
errors occurs across settings and disciplines; in a study of high-risk (non-health related)
industries, it was found that for every adverse event reported, 2.48 events went 
unreported (Probst & Estrada, 2010). An AHRQ report, “Critical Analysis of Patient 
Safety Practices,” suggests even higher rates of underreporting in health care (Shojania et 
al., 2001). A 2005 study conducted at a Boston teaching hospital compared patient-
identified adverse events against medical records and incident reporting systems.
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Patients identified 310 “distinct incident reports,” 75 percent of which (n = 235) were 
substantiated by independent physician reviewers. However, medical records provided 
evidence of 62 documented events, and yet no events were reported to the hospital's 
incident reporting system (Weingart et al., 2005).
O’Neil and colleagues conducted a similar review of medical records and found 
only 1.5 percent of adverse events were formally reported (O'Neil et al., 1993). Other 
studies have found up to 96 percent of medical errors go unreported (Barach & Small, 
2000). In 2010, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) Office of the 
Inspector General (OIG) reported similar findings, with 93 percent of adverse events 
going unreported. Of the seven percent of reported errors, only two percent were found to 
be accurate (Levinson, 2010). A 2012 follow up report from the DHHS revealed health 
care workers did not report patient harm six out of seven times (Levinson, 2012). These
studies reveal the majority, if not all, medical errors go unreported and problems with 
reporting are substantial. 
Barriers to Reporting
Barriers to reporting are multifaceted and can be attributed to organizational,
individual, and reporting system factors (Barach & Small, 2000; Pfeiffer, Manser, & 
Wehner, 2010). The institutional (organizational) culture in which individuals are 
immersed has a major impact on reporting behavior (Fein et al., 2005). In their study of 
high-risk industries, Probst and Estrada (2010) found the organizational safety climate of
an organization, defined as “a unified set of cognitions [held by workers] regarding the 
safety aspects of their organization” (p. 1439), was related to both the number of 
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accidents as well as the rate of reporting. Organizations with a strong safety climate 
experienced both fewer errors and less underreporting, while those with a poor safety 
climate experienced the opposite (Probst & Estrada, 2010). In health care, this is referred 
to as the ‘culture of medicine’ and is reported to be a significant barrier to reporting
(Leape & Berwick, 2005; Waring, 2005).
Often described as a system of ‘blame and shame,’ the culture of medicine breeds 
fear of individual culpability and retribution. Individuals are disinclined to report errors 
due to deep-seated fears they will be held personally accountable for any errors. These 
fears are also evident in perceptions and attitudes towards the characteristics of incident 
reporting systems. A theoretical review article of incident reporting behavior found 
nearly half (42 to 46 percent) of reasons given for not reporting were linked to fears of 
legal consequences and an overall absence of organizational support for reporting, such 
as lack of active leadership and unclear lines of reporting (Pfeiffer et al., 2010).
Individual beliefs regarding the purpose and utility of reporting systems are
another barrier to error reporting. A European study on physician incident reporting 
behavior found high skepticism (Waring, 2005). Physicians expressed beliefs that the 
health care system was overly complex and uncertain, and humans were inherently error-
prone. These factors lead physicians to the believe errors are inevitable and 
unmanageable and therefore, reporting pointless. Physicians in this study also perceived 
incident reporting as burdensome and the data it generates as threatening. Confidence 
was low among participants that reporting could overcome these barriers to improve 
outcomes. Another study of physician reporting behavior found procedural barriers 
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related to incident reporting systems and reporting. Nearly half of participants (45
percent) did not know how to report, and close to 60 percent did not know what kinds of 
errors to report (Kaldjian et al., 2008).
The literature supports the strong connection between an unsupportive 
organizational climate and underreporting. In a study of health care workers, focus group 
participants expressed “profound fears” associated with error reporting. Barriers included
fear of retribution (loss of job, hours, and pay), disciplinary action, increased litigation, 
damage to professional reputation, and unsupportive colleagues (Fein et al., 2005). Fear-
based barriers also include the negative experience of disclosing the error to the family 
and medical team, which elicited feelings of shame. Focus group participants also 
admitted being fearful that disclosure would “undermine [their] relationship with the 
patient” and lead to an erosion of trust (Fein et al., 2005, p. 490). A lack of institutional 
tolerance and support for errors were cited as primary drivers of these fears.  
Hierarchies 
Embedded within organizations, status or hierarchies are another barrier to 
reporting (Lawton & Parker, 2002; Waring, 2005). Status refers to the degree of respect
and influence conferred to an individual based on characteristics such as education, 
wealth, age, or profession (Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006). A seminal paper on status
describes how individuals possessing more of these attributes are deemed to be more 
desirable than others, and therefore retain a higher position within the social hierarchy 
(Benoit-Smullyan, 1944). In the workplace, status is role-based and can be inferred from
occupational categories; in the health care industry, there is a well-established 
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professional hierarchy, both within and between teams (Kanes, 2010). For example, it is 
widely acknowledged that surgeons receive higher prestige than do primary care 
physicians, who in turn garner more prestige than nurses. Likewise, charge nurses retain a 
higher hierarchical position than floor nurses, and nurses more position than therapists. 
This preferential treatment leads to feelings of superiority/inferiority, and is known to 
influence behavior (Tajfel & Turner, 2004).
It follows, then, that individuals of lower status tend to withhold information, 
defer decisions, limit behavior, speak less than their higher-status colleagues, and often 
have lower self-efficacy (Driskell & Salas, 1991; Leonard, Graham, & Bonacum, 2004; 
Pagliari & Grimshaw, 2002). Kaiser Permanente, the nation’s largest nonprofit health 
plan, reported low-status individuals are less likely to speak up or question higher status 
individuals (Leonard et al., 2004). A study of fourth-year medical students found a
similar “steep authority gradient.” The authors discovered that, although the students 
recognized errors and were supportive of patient safety initiatives, the relationships of 
“power and social influence undergirding the traditional authority gradient in the culture 
of medicine” were a major barrier to reporting (Wetzel, Dow, & Mazmanian, 2012, p. 
222). One-quarter of students stated they would never report a faculty member for unsafe 
behavior, and of the students who did endorse reporting, the majority (91.6 percent) only 
disclosed errors to residents instead of faculty or staff. Similar results were found in a
study of Taiwanese nurses, in which 45 percent of the variance in error reporting 
behavior was related to differences in status (Chiang & Pepper, 2006). Reporting across 
status boundaries is often described as ‘whistleblowing’ and considered a “cultural 
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taboo” (Waring, 2005).
The effect of hierarchies is most evident in industries with poor organizational 
climates, as evidenced by comparative studies of health care and aviation (Kilduff, 
Willer, & Anderson, 2016; Okuyama, Wagner, & Bijnen, 2014). The Texas Human 
Factors Group conducted a study on the perceptions of teamwork, communication, 
hierarchy, errors, and stress by sampling physicians, nurses, and residents (n=1033)
working in the intensive care unit (ICU) and operating room (OR) and (n=30,000)
cockpit crew members (Sexton, Thomas, & Helmreich, 2000). The researchers found a
significant difference in perceptions of hierarchies between the two groups. A majority of 
cockpit crew members (97 percent) and ICU staff (94 percent) advocated for flat 
hierarchies, while more than half (55 percent) of surgeons believed junior team members 
should not question the decisions of senior members (p. 747). These hierarchies also 
impacted teamwork and communication on the health care teams, most notably in the 
subsample of operating room staff. Sexton et al., (2000), found only 40 percent of nurses 
reported good teamwork and communication, compared to 77 percent of physicians. This
finding supports other research demonstrating troubled relationships between medicine
and nursing (Greenfield, 1999; Kaissi, 2008; Zwarenstein & Bryant, 2000).
The impact of hierarchies has a direct influence on behavior. Trained rater 
observations of commercial flights and randomly selected medical procedures found 85
percent of flights observed had outstanding to standard ratings of teamwork, compared to 
an average of 60 percent of the medical procedures observed (Sexton et al., 2000).
Another comparative study examined attitudes toward safety, finding problematic or 
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oppositional responses (to safety) in 17.5 percent of hospital personnel, compared to only 
5.6 percent of naval aviators (Gaba, Singer, Sinaiko, Bowen, & Ciavarelli, 2003).
Hierarchies effect the dynamics of teams, which influence attitudes that, in turn, shape 
behaviors. These factors may be implicit in the rate and severity of errors founds in the 
health care industry (B. Sexton et al., 1998; Wiener, Kanki, & Helmreich, 1993).
Comparative High-Risk Industries
Many safety lessons can be learned from other high-risk industries. Like aviation 
and nuclear power, health care organizations are high-risk professions where error has the 
potential for fatal consequences (Gaba et al., 2003; Lyndon, 2006; Rochlin, 1999). Each 
of these high-risk industries depend on human behavior to execute daily operations, and 
are increasingly technical, progressively complex, and stressful. Through concerted
efforts to improve communication and teamwork, the aviation industry has been able to 
transform its safety record (Bates et al., 1997; Kapur, Parand, Soukup, Reader, & 
Sevdalis, 2016). The creation of the Occupational Health and Safety Administration 
(OSHA) in 1971 reduced overall hazardous workplace deaths from “38 worker deaths a 
day in 1970 to 13 a day in 2015” (Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA), 2017). Although the healthcare industry has adopted of a few of aviation’s
system-level strategies, such as checklists and standardization, it has still failed to achieve 
the level of success experienced by other industries (Halasyamani et al., 2006; Horwitz, 
Krumholz, Green, & Huot, 2006).
The literature suggests aviation’s success in transforming its safety record can be 
attributed to a united effort to improve the culture of safety through an emphasis on 
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communication (Chassin, 2013; Chassin & Loeb, 2013; Patankar & Sabin, 2008).
Acknowledging the need for “improved communication, leadership, and decision making 
in the cockpit,” NASA developed a team training concept called Crew Resource 
Management (Lyndon, 2006; Salas, Burke, Bowers, & Wilson, 2001; Salas, Wilson,
Burke, & Wightman, 2006). The techniques of CRM create effective teams by 
establishing a sense of collective agency, where all team members solicit feedback, 
provide their opinions and recommendations, and speak freely about operations, in order 
to maintain safety, regardless of hierarchy or role (Rochlin, 1999; Simpson & Knox, 
2003; Sundar et al., 2007). Building on normal accident theory (NAT), in which 
accidents are regarded as inevitable and managed through active efforts to seek out and 
avert potential sources of harm (Tamuz & Harrison, 2006), safety is achieved by 
collective and continuous efforts to identify and manage sources of harm through 
effective or assertive communication (Henneman & Gawlinski, 2004; Simpson & Knox, 
2003). The aviation industry’s success using CRM as a model of safety has been cited as 
a driving force behind health care’s increased interest to improve communication and 
teamwork as an error reducing strategy (Lyndon, 2006).
Assertive communication, speaking up at critical moments or with persistence 
until a resolution is achieved, is important in error reporting, and known to improve 
performance (Lyndon, 2006; Lyndon et al., 2012; Simpson & Knox, 2003). It is 
considered an essential component of teamwork and plays a critical role in safety, 
particularly in high-risk industries (Simpson & Knox, 2003). A retrospective study of 
over 300 civilian flight report records found a lack of assertive communication 
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responsible for the fact that 20 percent of captain errors were unreported by the first 
officer (Jentsch, Barnett, Bowers, & Salas, 1999). Simpson and Knox found a similar 
theme in their review of adverse perinatal events, where lack of assertive communication 
was associated with increased adverse outcomes and near-misses (Simpson & Knox, 
2003).
The advances in safety demonstrated by the aviation industry were achieved 
through the cultivation of a culture in which hierarchies are flat, and team members feel 
safe to speak assertively and openly without fear or repercussion. Aviation achieved this 
by creating a psychologically safe environment. In order to improve error reporting and 
ultimately reduce medical errors, the health care industry must follow the example of the 
aviation industry, and make “substantial changes to achieve a safety climate consistent 
with the status of high-reliability organizations,” (Gaba et al., 2003, p. 173).
Psychological Safety
Some of the most frequently cited reasons for not reporting are linked to fear of 
repercussions, embarrassment, and professional shame; characteristics of a 
psychologically unsafe environment (Pfeiffer et al., 2010; Robinson et al., 2002; Waring, 
2005). Schein and Bennis (1965) first described the construct of psychological safety in 
the field of organizational change research where they recognized that individuals must 
feel secure to implement a change (Fairchild & Hunter, 2014). Edmondson (1999) 
defined this group-level construct as “a shared belief by members of a team that the team 
is safe for interpersonal risk taking” (p. 350). Edmondson characterizes interpersonal 
risk-taking as “learning” behaviors such as seeking feedback, experimentation, and
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discussing errors. It is through this process that errors, which provide valuable 
information on processes and procedures that did not work as planned, are discovered and 
corrected (Edmondson, 1999). Mutual trust and respect among team members create an 
environment in which individuals feel safe from embarrassment, rejection, and 
punishment, should they speak up, disagree, or challenge others' views. Individuals
working in psychologically-safe environments can express themselves without fear of 
negative consequences (Appelbaum et al., 2016). Psychologically safe environments 
promote learning outcomes, such as improved performance and effectiveness, by 
mitigating concern over how others will react to these learning behaviors.
Although a majority of the literature on psychological safety is centered on 
organizational team learning, the evidence suggests this construct may play a critical role 
in understanding the ‘motivators for and barriers to’ reporting behavior (Appelbaum et 
al., 2016; Derickson et al., 2015). A Veterans Health Administration (VHA) study found 
intention to disclose errors was significantly higher in individuals from psychologically 
safe environments, compared to those from unsafe environments (Derickson et al., 2015).
Psychologically unsafe environments were also found to hinder reporting in a mixed 
sample of nurses and physicians. Respondents reported fear of repercussions and lack of 
confidentiality as barriers to reporting across all job categories (Jeffe et al., 2004). A
study of neonatal intensive care units (NICU) demonstrated psychological safety to be a 
key factor in staff engagement in quality improvement activities, even after accounting 
for an overburdened workforce (Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006). NICU team members 
reported increased interest and adherence to quality improvement efforts when their
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teams were characterized by “interpersonal trust and respect” (Nembhard & Edmondson, 
2006, p. 957).
Hierarchies are one determinant of psychological safety. A study on the effects of 
professional status on psychological safety in NICUs confirmed professional status was 
positively related to psychological safety: physicians reported increased psychological 
safety compared to nurses, and nurses more than respiratory therapists (Nembhard & 
Edmondson, 2006). These self-censoring behaviors, described as organizational silence,
are directly related to perceptions of risk. Researchers found that individuals were willing 
to speak up when they were not worried about disapproval or negative consequences 
(Detert & Edmondson, 2005; Edmondson, 2003). They also discovered that individuals 
would self-censor or refrain from speaking up when leaders employed an authoritarian or 
autocratic leadership style (Leonard, Graham, & Bonacum, 2004). These 
counterproductive communication patterns are most pronounced across status gradients 
and result in negative tensions that often spill over into aspects of patient care (Park, 
2004). This impact on patient care becomes reflected in the incredibly high error rate (70
percent), ultimately attributed to communication failures (Dingley, Daugherty, Derieg, & 
Persing, 2008).
The behavior of a team leader has a strong influence on psychological safety and 
may reduce negative perceptions associated with error reporting (Appelbaum et al., 2016; 
Edmondson, 1996). Individual team members look to leaders to establish normative 
behavior regarding what is expected and acceptable in the workplace (Tyler & Lind, 
1992). Autocratic leaders are often perceived as unsafe and threatening, whereas a 
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democratic leadership style solicits input from individuals and is perceived as safe and 
welcoming. 
In a study of medication errors, nurses with autocratic managers were hesitant to
report or disclose errors out of fear of repercussions, while those with democratic 
managers reported feeling safe when speaking up (Edmondson, 1996). A study of cardiac 
teams also found that a democratic leadership style was associated with higher ratings of 
psychological safety (Edmondson, 2003). Leaders who solicited input from other team 
members were perceived as psychologically safe, compared to those who were more 
authoritarian. 
A cross-sectional study of Canadian health care workers explored nurses’ and 
physicians’ fear of repercussions for reporting medical errors. Leadership behavior at the 
organizational and unit levels explained 27.6 percent of the variance in fear of reporting 
for physicians and 15.8 percent for nurses (Castel, Ginsburg, Zaheer, & Tamim, 2015). It
is the combination of low-status individuals working within rigid hierarchies, in 
environments with low psychological safety, that is believed to be a key contributor to 
errors and the epidemic of underreporting (Park, 2004; Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006).  
Underreporting and Self-Regulation
Underreporting is particularly problematic when it occurs in a self-regulating 
industry such as health care. Freidson’s landmark report (1970) provides an extended 
analysis of the profession of medicine, which is both autonomous and self-directing. 
Self-regulation is described as one of the basic tenets of the profession of medicine, for
which it is provided a special status of “considerable freedom from outside control”
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(Collier, 2012; Donaldson, 2008, p.1). This freedom infers a social contract based on the 
principles of altruism, the assertion that the practice requires skills and knowledge not 
available to non-professionals, and the commitment to regulate its members (Berwick, 
2015; Baron, 2015; Cruess, Cruess, & Stinert, 2009; Donaldson, 2008). The right and 
obligation of self-regulation is designed to serve and protect patients. It is a privilege and 
a burden shared by all physicians and must be supported by all members of the 
profession” (Collier, 2012, p. 1560). Self-regulation works on the understanding that 
professionals will monitor and discipline themselves and other colleagues in a manner 
aligned with industry standards (Cruess, Cruess, & Stinert, 2009). The data on 
underreporting suggest the profession of medicine, and perhaps the health care industry 
as whole, is failing to uphold this part of the social contract. 
Gaps in Existing Literature
More than 20 years have passed since the IOM brought the problem of medical 
errors to the attention of the nation. Despite some progress, the incidence of errors and 
harm has continued to increase (Adler et al., 2018). Although studies have demonstrated 
that health care providers acknowledge the importance of reporting, the translation of 
beliefs into behaviors remains elusive (Kaldjian et al., 2008). This is evidenced by claims
that up to 96 percent of medical errors go unreported (Barach & Small, 2000) and
preventable deaths due to medical errors may be the third leading cause of death in the 
United States (James, 2013).
A critical review of the literature provides some insight on why health care
remains so far behind other high-risk industries in safety improvements. One notable gap
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is an absence of theoretically grounded literature on error reporting (Holden & Karsh, 
2007; Karsh, Holden, Alper, & Or, 2006; Kingston, Evans, Smith, & Berry, 2004). There 
is also an overabundance of studies on the barriers to reporting, with limited examination
of the predictors of the behavior (Antonow et al., 2000; Beasley, Escoto, & Karsh, 2004; 
Leape, 2002; Suresh et al., 2004; Uribe et al., 2002; Wakefield et al., 1999; Weingart, 
Callanan, Ship, & Aronson, 2001).
The majority of the theoretical and atheoretical literature on error reporting 
behavior is centered on medication and adverse drug events, with few studies looking at 
reporting behavior in a more general context. There is strong evidence to support a 
theoretically based approach to understanding error reporting behavior. Two recent 
studies on adverse drug event reporting found the theory of planned behavior (TPB) 
explained between 16 and 44 percent of the variance in the nursing staff’s intention to 
report (Angelis et al., 2017; Hung, Chu, Lee, & Hsiao, 2016). A study utilizing the TPB 
in a sample of hospital pharmacists found the model explained 32 percent of the variance 
in the intention to report medication errors (Williams, Phipps, & Ashcroft, 2015). These 
results were similar to another study of hospital pharmacists, which found 34 percent of
the variance in reporting behavior was explained by two constructs of the TPB (Gavaza et 
al., 2011).
Theoretical Framework
TPB is an extension of Fishbein and Ajzen’s Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA),
and is one of the most widely tested theories of human behavior (I. Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1980). Ajzen’s TPB proposes that behavioral, normative, and control beliefs 
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influence an individual’s attitude towards the behavior of interest (ATB), subjective 
norms (SN), and perceived behavioral control (PBC), respectively (see Figure 1). These 
factors in turn influence the intention (INT) to engage in a behavior, which is described 
by Ajzen as the immediate antecedent of behavior, and the strongest predictor of actual
behavior (I. Ajzen, 1991).Intention is frequently used as a proxy for measuring actual 
behavior, particularly in instances where direct observation of the behavior of interest is 
unrealistic or difficult to achieve and the behavior-intention correlation is thought to be 
high (Ajzen, 2011, p. 1115). Reporting behavior is one of these instances. To obtain a 
direct measure reporting behavior, researchers would have to accurately identify all errors 
that occurred (the denominator) against errors reported (numerator). Identifying all errors
that occur in health care would be extremely difficult from both a logistical and practical
standpoint.
Figure 1
Theory of Planned Behavior
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The TPB extends the TRA through the addition of the construct of perceived 
behavioral control, a construct that captures the degree to which behavior is under 
volitional control. Volitional control refers to an individual’s ability to exercise a degree 
of control over their behavior, and suggests they have the knowledge, skills, and 
resources to do so (Frith, 2013). The TRA assumes complete volitional control, whereas 
the TPB acknowledges that behavioral control is often governed by factors such as 
adequate time and resources. When a behavior is not under a person’s complete control, 
the variable of perceived behavioral control can directly influence behavior. Although the 
literature suggests that reporting behavior is under volitional control, there is evidence 
that the time-consuming process of reporting serves as a substantial barrier (Barach & 
Small, 2000; Chiang & Pepper, 2006; Lee, Yang, & Chen, 2016; Uribe et al., 2002; Zhao 
& Olivera, 2006).
The TPB is a well-validated model that has been applied to numerous public 
health issues, such as smoking cessation, drug use, HIV testing, condom use, skin cancer 
protection, exercise, and fat consumption, to explain, examine, and predict human 
behavior (Appiah, Tenkorang, & Maticka-Tyndale, 2017; Ayodele, 2017; Hamilton, 
Kirkpatrick, Rebar, White, & Hagger, 2017; Lloret Irles, Morell-Gomis, Laguia, & 
Moriano, 2017; Record, Harrington, Helme, & Savage). Since the theory’s inception, 
hundreds of studies have confirmed both its structure and predictive validity. A meta-
review of over 200 data sets found the TPB predicted, on average, 19 to 40 percent of the 
variance in intention to engage in a behavior (Rivis & Sheeran, 2003). Although these 
effect sizes are impressive, a substantial proportion of variance in behavior remains 
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unexplained. Some of this has been attributed to methodological factors, while others 
may be conceptual.  
There is a growing movement towards an expanded version of the TPB to 
improve model statistics (see Figure 2). One area in which the theory may need 
expanding is regarding the construct of subjective norms (SN), which has been shown in 
some cases to be comparatively weak in its relationship with intention. In the original 
TPB model, SN are injunctive in nature. Injunctive norms capture what others ought to
do, compared to descriptive norms, which reflect what others actually do. There is strong 
evidence to support adding descriptive norms (DN) into the TPB as an additional 
predictor variable (Rivis & Sheeran, 2003). In addition to the medium-to-strong average 
correlation between DN and intention, DNs have been shown to add an additional five
percent to the explained variance in intention, above and beyond attitude, SN, and
perceived behavioral control (Rivis & Sheeran, 2003).
The literature has demonstrated a clear link between psychological safety and 
reporting behavior, yet there have been very few studies that have attempted to measure 
the increased utility of including it in a conceptual framework. A study by Lee et al. 
(2016) utilized an expanded model of the TPB to compare incident-reporting behavior 
among nursing staff for errors they observed versus errors in which they were personally 
involved. In both scenarios, psychological safety had a significant effect on the intention 
to report, with models explaining between 10 and 20 percent of the variance in behavior 
(Lee et al., 2016). Another study integrating the TPB and psychological safety (safety 
climate) in military maintenance personnel found the integrated model accounted for 
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nearly 50 percent of the variance in the intention to report unsafe behavior (Fogarty & 
Shaw, 2010).
The available data on the error reporting behavior of health care professionals are
somewhat partial to nursing and pharmacy staff, with limited information available on 
physicians. Nurses are at the frontline of the patient safety movement, with the majority 
of all error reports (80 percent) being made by nursing staff (Tuttle, Holloway, Baird, 
Figure 2
Theory of Planned Behavior, Expanded Model
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Sheehan, & Skelton, 2004). Physicians were noted to have made only one percent of all 
error reports (Rowin et al., 2008). Another study showed physicians only reported serious 
errors, such as those resulting in death, while nursing staff were more likely to report all 
events, particularly those causing minimal or no harm (Rowin et al., 2008). This is highly 
problematic, given that physicians are frontline workers and status hierarchies are a 
known barrier to reporting (Tucker, Singer, Hayes, & Falwell, 2008).
The scarcity of data on physician reporting behavior may be handicapping patient 
safety efforts and indirectly contributing to the belief that reporting is primarily the
responsibility of nursing staff (Cook et al., 2004). A brief review of the literature on 
physician response rates to research surveys was conducted to optimize study recruitment 
efforts. A study examining reasons for not participating in postal questionnaire surveys in
a sample of general practitioners found the importance of topic and/or relevancy to the 
practitioner’s specialty was very important when deciding to respond (Kaner, Haighton, 
& McAvoy, 1998). Other studies suggested multiple follow up reminders and the use of 
“noncommittal” incentives (i.e. coffee shop gift card) to improve response rates
(Abdulaziz et al., 2015; Hocking, Lim, Read, & Hellard, 2006; Robertson, Walkom, & 
McGettigan, 2005).
Contributions of the Current Study
Error reporting can be conceptualized as a complex health behavior. Engaging 
health care professionals in this behavior is needed before meaningful impacts on health 
outcomes can be actualized. However, implementing this behavior change has proved
difficult. This study aimed to increase understanding of the predictors of reporting 
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behavior using a survey modeled after the theory of planned behavior. The survey 
assessed the predictive utility of expanding the theoretical model to include a measure of 
psychological safety and used responses to case study scenarios to capture a novel
measure of intention, termed intention simulation. Understanding the strength in which 
certain variables influence behavior is critical to developing targeted interventions. This 
is particularly important in the fast-paced, high-stakes industry of health care.
This study extends the literature on reporting behavior through a targeted 
campaign directed towards physicians. There is disparate information available on 
physicians, compared to nursing and pharmacy staff. Filling these gaps allows for a full 
conceptualization of the problem. The airline industry did not transform their safety 
record by ignoring the role pilots played in the problem and, ultimately, the solution.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
A theory-driven approach was used to better understand medical error reporting 
behavior in healthcare professionals licensed in the state of Kentucky. Questions modeled 
after the theory of planned behavior (TPB) assessed the degree to which an individual 
was ready to engage in the behavior of error reporting (i.e. the intention to report) and the
immediate antecedents of behavior (subjective norms, perceived behavioral control,
attitude). The methods described in this chapter were used to answer the following 
research questions and corresponding study hypotheses:
Research Question 1(a) – What is the relationship between attitude towards
behavior, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control and the intention to 
report medical errors? Hypothesis 1: The theory of planned behavior will 
significantly predict the intention to report medical errors.
Research Question 1(b) – Does the inclusion of additional variables in an
expanded theory of planned behavior model explain additional variance in 
intention scores? Hypothesis 2: Inclusion of background variables, past 
reporting behavior, and actual behavioral control will significantly predict 
intention scores.
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Research Question 2(a) – What is the relationship between psychological
safety and the intention to report? Hypothesis 1: Psychological safety will be a 
significant predictor of the intention to report medical errors. 
Research Question 2(b) – What is the relationship between TPB antecedents
of behavior, psychological safety, and the intention to report medical errors?
Hypothesis 2: The inclusion of psychological safety as an additional predictor 
variable in the theory of planned behavior will significantly improve 
explanatory power of the model.
Research Question 2(c) – Does the inclusion of psychological safety in an
expanded model explain additional variance in intention scores? Hypothesis 3:
Inclusion psychological safety as an additional predictor variable in an 
expanded model of the TPB will significantly predict intention scores.
Research Question 3 – How does psychological safety influence the intention
to report? Hypothesis 1: Psychological safety will independently influence the 
intention to report.
Research Question 4 – Can an alternative measure of intention better
approximate actual behavior? Hypothesis 1: Intention simulation will serve as 
a better proxy for actual behavior than generalized intention in predicting error 
reporting behavior.
Participants
Participants in this study were hospital-based health care professionals licensed to 
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practice in the state of Kentucky and included nurses (Registered Nurses, Nurse 
Practitioners, Licensed Practical Nurses) and physicians (Attending/Staff Physician, 
Resident Physicians/Fellows, Physician Assistants). Corresponding job titles mirrored
categories on the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture released by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ, 2004, Section H, Question 4).
Recruitment
A national healthcare marketing company was contracted to conduct an email 
recruitment campaign for this study. DMD Marketing (DMD) corporation is a fee-for-
service organization with access to over 6 million “opted-in” email addresses of US 
healthcare professionals. DMD has deployed over 300 million emails across 50,000 email 
campaigns, primarily servicing the pharmaceutical industry (DMD Marketing 
Corporation, 2018). DMD advertises their physician database as one of the most 
comprehensive, with over 90% representation. A certification of authentication provided 
by media-auditing organization, BPA Worldwide, was available upon request as a 
guarantee that each email address belonged to a qualified recipient. Email address were a 
mix of personal and professional address, described by DMD as the practitioner’s 
preferred email, and is described in more detail in the product and services manual 
(DMD, 2018).
DMD owns proprietary rights and offers access to three healthcare provider
databases (physicians, nurses and practitioners) (DMD Marketing Corporation, 2018).
Optimization of this email campaign was achieved through audience segmentation,
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including filters which selected only hospital-staffed healthcare professionals (physician, 
practitioner, nurse) who were licensed to practice in Kentucky. An additional filter in the 
physician database included all AMA self-designated practice specialty (SDPS) codes.
The practitioner and nursing groups were filtered by position, specialty, and education. 
Filtering for the nursing group included the following positions: advanced practice, 
licensed practical nurse (LPN), manager, case manager, staff nurse, registered nurse 
(RN), clinical specialist, and Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists (CRNA).
Executive-level management, administrators, education and staff development, 
occupational and physical therapists, allied health professionals, school nurses, and 
contractors were excluded. All education levels were included (associate degree/diploma, 
BS/BSN, MS/MSN, Doctorate /PhD). The practitioner group was also filtered by 
specialty and included all available specialties, except those specifically referencing 
outpatient care or education. A one-time data use agreement for the AMA Physician 
Professional Data (AMA-PPD) was executed, and all components of the email campaign 
complied with the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003.
DMD marketing corporation was under contract to deploy the survey to 3,000 
email addresses randomly selected from each of the three practitioner databases. The
physician assistant/nurse practitioner database did not have 3,000 email addresses 
available for sampling after optimization filters were applied, resulting in a total 
deployment less nine thousand.
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Data Cleaning 
Data cleaning was conducted to identify and correct errors that could have a 
negative impact on study results. Following good clinical practices, all data handling 
procedures were standardized and documented (Van den Broeck, Cunningham, Eeckels, 
& Herbst, 2005). Upon closure of the survey, 113 records were exported from Qualtrics 
into excel. All variables were independently inspected for missing data or unusual 
responses. Screening including identifying inconsistencies, odd patterns and other 
unexpected result. This included data values falling outside the expected range. Study 
variables were renamed and the datafile imported in SPSS.
SPSS variables were recoded from categorical into scale and summary composite 
scores were calculated. Missing data received a user-defined missing value (-99) to allow 
SPSS to perform computations by omitting missing values through pairwise or listwise
deletion. Double data entry and random spot checks were used as quality assurance 
measures. All data coding procedures described above were replicated resulting in a 
seconds or analysis dataset. A 10% random spot check of responses was conducted for 
accuracy checks (Van den Broeck et al., 2005).
Data Analysis Plan
Multiple regression was used to answer the research questions in this study. Ajzen
(1991) states that multiple regression, structural equation modeling, latent class analysis
are all acceptable methods to determine the importance of beliefs. The assumptions of 
regression were evaluated prior to data analysis. Scatterplots were used to check for a 
linear relationship between variables. The assumption of the independence of 
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observations was assessed using the Durbin-Watson statistic. A Durbin-Watson value (d) 
between the critical values of 1.5 < d <2.5 assumed no first order linear autocorrelation 
(Field, 2009). Responses from participants were only be measured at one-time point to 
ensure independence of observations. The presence of homoscedasticity in the data (i.e., 
equal variance between variables) was assessed by plotting the studentized residuals 
against the unstandardized predicted values. Levene’s test assessed of the equality of 
error variance. 
To determine if multicollinearity (i.e., two or more highly correlated variables)
was present in the data, correlation and Tolerance/VIF values were examined. A
minimum tolerance value of .10 recommended by Tabachnik & Fidell (2001) was used to 
assess this assumption. Tolerance values as high as .25 were found in the literature
(Huber & Stephens, 1993). A maximum Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of 10 was used 
to measures the impact of collinearity among variables (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & 
Black, 1995; Kennedy, 1992), although lower maximum values (4 -5) can also be found 
in the literature (Rogerson, 2001; Pan & Jackson, 2008). Leverage was used to assess 
outliers or undue influence among the predictor variables using Cook’s distance (D), with 
a cutoff value of 1 (Cook, 1977). Values greater than one were considered influential and
suspicious of being an outlier. Residuals were evaluated for normal distribution through a 
histogram and a normal probability (P-P) plot and a normal quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plot.
Model summary statistics determined how well the regression model fit the data. 
The multiple correlation coefficient (R) indicated the level of prediction. The coefficient 
of determination (R2) showed the proportion of variance in the criterion variable 
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explained by the predictor variables (i.e., the proportion of variance accounted for by the 
regression model). The F-ratio tested if the overall regression model was a good fit for 
the data. Estimated model coefficients were used to determine the how the criterion 
variable varies with each predictor variable when all other predictor variables were held 
constant. T values were used to evaluate the significance of each predictor variable, with 
p < .05 indicating significance (Miller, 2009). The PROCESS procedure created and 
described by Hayes in An Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional 
Process Analysis (2017) was followed to test for a mediating relationship between 
psychological safety, the antecedents of behavior, and intention.
Dependent Variable
This study examined the general behavior of reporting medical errors, defined in 
terms of target, action, context, and time (TACT) as described by Francis et al. (2004, p. 
8). Given the difficulties associated with direct observation of this behavior, a measure of
intention was used as a proxy to actual behavior. Following TACT methodology, the 
behavior of interest in this study was defined as follows: target (medical errors), action 
(reporting intention), context (hospital work area/unit), and time (implicitly, as soon as 
possible).
To ensure the principle of compatibility was observed, all constructs were
measured at the same level of specificity when appropriate (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975;
1977; Ajzen, 1988). The principle of compatibility posits that predictive power is 
increased when measures of the predictor and criterion variables match on the target, 
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action, context, and time. Observing this principle minimizes discrepancies between 
attitude/intention and behavior. A meta-analysis conducted by Kraus (1995) found
attitude-behavior correlations increased from r = .14 to r = .50 when the principle of 
compatibility was maintained.
Sample Size Calculations
Sample size calculations for this exploratory study were calculated using an A
Priori G*Power analysis (F tests; Linear multiple regression: Fixed model, R2 increase) 
which suggested a sample size of N = 85 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).
G*Power calculations were based on α = .05, power (1-ß) = .80, a medium effect size = 
.30, and a total of four predictors (attitude, perceived behavioral control, subjective 
norms, psychological safety). These calculations were consistent with recommendations
from Francis et al. (2004), which suggested a sample size of N = 80 for a regression 
analysis with an expected medium effect size of d = .30 (Cohen, 1988).
Apparatus
Study data were collected using the web-based survey tool Qualtrics XM®, hosted 
at the University of Louisville (Qualtrics, 2017). The survey instrument was structured
into two sections. The first section consisted of 37 multiple-choice questions, while the 
second contained six case study scenarios with a maximum of three additional questions.
Additional questions were displayed using branching logic and based on item response,
with a maximum of 18 possible options. The maximum number of questions for the 
survey was 55 (range 43-55). The survey included an optional open-ended response box 
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for participants to give feedback on the case studies or error reporting in general. The
study utilized an unsigned consent form (i.e., preamble), and submission of the survey 
implied informed consent. Data were stored in an encrypted, password-protected
computer in a locked office. Only the investigator and regulatory/oversight officials at the 
University had access to the data. The institutional review board (IRB) approved the 
study and all materials (see Appendix A).
MEASURES
The first section of the survey instrument included four measures corresponding 
to the constructs of the theory of planned behavior: attitude, subjective norms, perceived 
behavioral control, and intention [to report medical errors]. Measures of psychological 
safety and past reporting behavior were also collected. The second section of the survey 
consisted of six patient safety case study scenarios. Responses to these case studies were 
used to calculate a measure of intention simulation. The complete survey instrument can 
be found in Appendix B.
Background Variables
Verbiage for demographics, past reporting behavior, and safety culture questions 
was taken directly from the Agency of Healthcare Research and Quality’s (AHRQ) 
Hospital Survey on Patient Safety (SOPS) (AHRQ, July 2013). The SOPS was developed
for public use and available free of charge. The instrument was designed to be 
administered to health care professionals at various levels (individual, unit, departmental,
46
and organizational), with good psychometric properties based on data from 50,513
respondents across 331 hospitals in the United States (Sorra et al., 2016). Sorra et al.'s 
(2016) analysis examined item factor loading, interclass correlations (ICCs), design 
effects, internal consistency reliabilities, and multilevel confirmatory factor analyses 
(MCFA). Item factor loadings averaged .80, with criterion values > .40. ICCs averaged 
.10, with values between .05 and 5.0 percent being acceptable. Average design effects 
were 3.10, with criterion values > 2.0. Internal consistency reliability values ranged from 
.62 to .85 with all but one composite with values .70 or greater. The MCFA values at 
both the unit (.54 -1.0) and individual level (.36 - .93) were within acceptable ranges.
Past Reporting Behavior
A single statement taken from the AHRQ’s Hospital Survey on Patient Safety 
Culture (2004, Section G, pg. 4) assessed the number of events reported over the past 12 
months, which served as a measure of past reporting behavior. Participants were asked 
“In the past 12 months, how many medical errors or events [that you personally 
committed or observed] have you reported to an incident reporting system or a 
manager/supervisor?” with six response categories ranging from no reports to 21 or more 
reports. Following scoring methodology used by the AHRQ in their 2016 Comparative 
Database Report, the number of event reports reported were recoded into binary 
categories, no reports (0) versus one or greater reports (1), described as percent positive 
scoring (Chart 5-4, p. 27).
Participants were also asked to report the number of errors they either committed
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or observed over the same 12-month period, using a modified version of the AHRQ’s 
past reporting behavior question (Section G, pg.4). Participants were asked “In the past 
12 months, how many medical errors or ‘events’ have you committed or observed?” with 
the same six response categories.
Safety Culture
The Study Group on Human Factors defines safety culture as a collection of 
“individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of 
behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an 
organization’s health and safety management” (Sorra et al., 2016, p. 1). The AHRQ’s 
Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture contains a total of twelve composites to 
measure these domains. To keep response burden low, this study included only one 
composite measure (Communication Openness) and an overall patient safety grade.  
Communication Openness 
This composite defined the extent to which staff feel safe to speak up or question 
authority when issues of patient safety are at stake. This composite was assessed by three 
items measured on a five-point scale. Response options included: Never, Rarely,
Sometimes, Most of the time, Always. Items assessed were: (1) “Staff will freely speak 
up if they see something that may negatively affect patient care” (2) “Staff feel free to 
question the decisions or actions of those with more status or authority” (3) “Staff are 
afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right” (negatively worded). The
frequency of responses for each survey item was calculated and negatively worded items 
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were reverse coded following the methodology outlined in the AHRQ Hospital Survey on 
Patient Safety Culture: User’s Guide to calculate composite and percent positive scores
(Sorra et al., 2016, p. 30).
Patient Safety Grade
This question allows participants to assign an overall “grade” on patient safety to 
individual work units assessed by one item: "Please give your work area/unit in this 
hospital an overall grade on patient safety based on the past 12 months" with five
response categories: Excellent (A), Very Good (B), Acceptable (C), Poor (D), and Failing 
(F).
Psychological Safety 
Psychological safety is defined as a “shared belief that a team is safe for 
interpersonal risk taking” (Edmondson, 1999). Psychological safety was measured using 
Edmondson’s (1999) Psychological Safety Scale, which contain seven questions assessed 
on a five-point scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.” Participants were 
asked to answer questions based on their work/team environment. Items were: (1) “If you 
make a mistake on this team, it is often held against you”, (2) “Members of this team are 
able to bring up problems and tough issues”, (3) “People on this team sometimes reject 
others for being different”, (4) “It is safe to take a risk on this team”, (5) “It is difficult to 
ask other members of this team for help”, (6) “No one on this team would deliberately act 
in a way that undermines my efforts”, and (7) “My unique skills and talents are valued 
and utilized while working with members of this team”. The mean of the seven 
psychological safety items were calculated to give an overall score of psychological 
49
safety. Higher scores were reflective of higher levels of psychological safety.  
Theory of Planned Behavior
The primary measure used in this study was based on the Theory of Planned
Behavior and constructed following the methodology outlined in the Manual for Health 
Services Researchers (Francis et al., 2004). Guidance from Fishbein & Ajzen’s TPB 
Questionnaire Construction was also consulted (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). The domains 
of attitude towards behavior, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, and 
intention were assessed on a five-point scale and are described below.
Attitude Towards Behavior
Ajzen describes attitude towards a behavior as a person’s positive or negative 
view of performing the behavior in question” (1991). A direct measurement of attitude 
towards the behavior was assessed by a single stem statement followed by four 5-point 
adjectives. The stem statement was: “Overall, I think reporting medical errors is:” 
Response items were: 1) “Good/Bad Practice,” which captures the overall evaluation of 
the attitude towards a behavior, 2) “Harmful/Beneficial,” 3) “Pleasant/Unpleasant,” 4)
“Worthless/Useful.” Items were arranged to reflect a mix of negative and positive 
endpoints. The mean of the four attitude item scores were calculated to give an overall 
attitude score. Items with negative endpoints towards the right “Good/Bad; 
Pleasant/Unpleasant” were recoded so that higher numbers reflected a positive attitude
towards the behavior. An estimate of internal consistency was computed (Cronbach’s 
alpha) for all measures. 
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Subjective Norms 
Subjective norms (SN) reflect an individual’s perception of the social pressure to 
engage or not engage in a behavior (Ajzen, 1991). There are two types of normative 
behaviors, described as injunctive and descriptive norms. Injunctive norms refer to 
perceptions of behavior that is approved or disapproved by others (i.e., what others ought 
to do), while descriptive norms refer to how others actually behave (Cialdini, Reno, & 
Kallgren, 1990). This study assessed both types of normative behavior through four 
questions measured on a five-point scale. Three items assessed injunctive subjective 
norms, (a) “It is expected of me that I report medical errors;” (b) “I feel under social 
pressure to report medical errors;” and (c) “Most people who are important to me thought 
that (I should/I should not) report medical errors.” The fourth question, (d) “Most people 
who are important to me report medical errors,” captured descriptive subjective norms. 
Items with negative endpoints towards the right were recoded so that higher numbers 
reflect greater social pressure to engage in the behavior. The mean of the three subjective 
norm (injunctive) items were calculated to give an overall subjective norm (SNI) score.
All four questions were combined to give an overall subjective norm average score.
Perceived Behavioral Control   
Perceived behavioral control (PBC) reflects an individual's confidence in 
performing the target behavior (Ajzen, 2006). This encompasses a “person’s self-efficacy 
and beliefs about the controllability of the behavior” (p. 21). A direct measurement of 
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PBC was assessed by four questions, utilizing a five-point scale. Items were arranged to 
reflect a mix of negative and positive endpoints. The four items that assessed PBC were 
(a) “I am confident that I could report a medical error if I wanted to;” (b) “For me to 
report a medical error is;” (c) “The decision to report a medical error is beyond my
control;” and (d) “Whether I report a medical error or not is entirely up to me.” The mean 
of the four PBC item scores were calculated to give an overall PBC score.  Items with 
negative endpoints towards the right “Easy/Difficult” were recoded so that higher
numbers “reflect a greater level of control over the target behavior” (Francis et al., 2004, 
p. 22).
Intention
The intention to report medical errors was used as a proximal measure of behavior 
in the absence of actual behavior (Ajzen, 2006). Intention (generalized) was measured by 
three questions: (a) “I expect that I will report medical errors;” (b) “I want to report 
medical errors;” (c) “I intend to report medical errors.” Questions were scored using a 
five-point scale ranging from “Strongly agree” to “Strongly disagree.”  
CASE STUDIES
Responses to case studies were used in the second section of this study to 
calculate a measure of intention simulation. Case Studies (i.e., case vignettes, case 
studies, case reports) are used in both qualitative and quantitative research as a non-
threatening method to explore judgments and actions of sensitive topics. This study used 
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the Constant Variable Value Vignette method (Kathiresan & Patro, 2013), a variant of the 
case study method, to assess differences in reporting behavior across different types of
health care providers and different situations (Barter & Renold, 1999). Originating in 
business ethics research, this method presents all participants with identical vignettes and 
focuses solely on outcomes. Strengths associated with using vignettes include a quick and
cost-effective method of obtaining data on topics that might otherwise be difficult to 
obtain. However, the limitations associated with using vignettes include threats to 
external validity. Parkinson and Manstead (1993) argue against their use, suggesting that 
vignette data does not allow for generalizations and can only be understood within the 
context of the vignettes. Other reports propose vignettes may overestimate actual 
behavior (Eifler, 2007).
Cook and Hoas (2004) developed the case studies that were used in this study as
part of their Advancing Patient Safety study supported by the AHRQ (AHRQ R01-
HS11930). Case studies were taken from University of Montana’s Health Care Ethics 
Study website (Cook & Hoas, 2020). This website resource contains 53 patient safety 
case studies based on actual events encountered by rural health care providers who 
participated in the Healthcare Ethics Study over the course of four years, in 30 hospitals, 
across nine states. Nineteen of the 53 case studies include a full summary analysis 
developed in conjunction with researchers at Rush Medical College. The analysis model 
used for summarizing each case includes defining the topic, issues, learning points, 
guides, disclosure, and room for improvement, as well as several background questions.
Case studies included both clinical and ethical issues, with some cases containing more 
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than one type of IOM classified error (i.e., diagnostic, treatment, preventive, other). All
materials in the patient safety manual (including case studies) were available free of 
charge. No copyright permissions were required for the use of these materials.
Case Study Selection Process
Case studies considered for inclusion in this study were limited to the 19 
summarized cases. Cases with an exclusive focus on child/infant health issues (n = 5)
were excluded, and multiple cases related to medication and dosing errors were omitted 
to minimize redundancy of error types (n = 2). Cases without clear-cut error classification 
such as polypharmacy (n = 1), those with a strong ethical focus (n = 1), and complex case 
scenarios (n = 1) were also excluded. To minimize respondent burden, cases studies with 
a word count >350 (n = 4) were also excluded. Consideration was taken to have 
representation of each type of error (diagnostic, treatment, prevention). Further selection 
criteria included the level of harm caused by the error in the scenario. To assess if
responses were related to the degree of harm, cases from each group (death, permanent 
harm, and no permanent harm/near miss) were selected. An adverse event resulting in 
death or permanent harm is subject to mandatory reporting requirements, whereas 
reporting events that inflict little to no permanent harm are voluntary.
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Table 6
Case Studies by Error Type and Issue
Case #1 Treatment – Error in dose of drug
Case #2 Prevention – Inadequate monitoring or follow up treatment
Case #3 Treatment – Error in the dose of drug 
*Permanent Harm
Case #4 Diagnostic – Failure to employ indicated test resulting in death 
*Sentinel Event
Case #5 Treatment - Error in the performance of an operation, procedure or test   
- Avoidable delay in treatment
Case #6 Treatment - Error in administering the treatment 
- Error in the dose or method of using a drug
*Sentinel event is defined by the Joint Commission as a patient safety event resulting in death, permanent
harm, or severe temporary harm and intervention required to sustain life
Error Recognition 
All cases presented in this study contained reportable error scenarios. An error 
recognition score was calculated by first asking participants if they believed an error had 
occurred. Yes, answers were summed and represented the participants raw error
recognition score. Score were converted into percentages for classification purposes.
Responses of ‘unsure, maybe, or no’ were combined and counted as a negative 
endorsement or lack of recognition. A total of 72 participants (64 percent) completed all 
6 cases. Average recognitions score were out of a maximum of six,M = 4.94, SD = 1.05.  
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The average recognition score was 82 percent. Over 37% of the sample correctly 
identified all six cases as containing an error (i.e. 100%), while 31% received a failing 
score (67 percent or less).
Recognition scores were examined by position (physician, practitioner, nurse) to 
assess for any hierarchical or positional differences. One-way ANOVA found no 
significant differences across the groups (p = .971). Nurses had the highest percent 
correct recognition scores (M = 82.76, SD = 19.15), followed by physicians (M = 81.75, 
SD = 17.40), and practitioners (M = 81.67, SD = 16.13). Differences in percent correct 
recognition scores related to psychological safety were explored and found to be 
nonsignificant, F(2, 67) = 0.76, p = .47. Individuals working in environments with high 
psychological safety had the highest percent correct error recognition score (M = 88.89, 
SD = 8.33), followed by those working in environments with low psychological safety, 
who had higher mean error recognition scores (M = 83.33, S. = 17.57) compared to those 
in environments with moderate psychological safety (M = 81.05, SD = 18.86).  
Intention Simulation 
Intention simulation is the most time-consuming method of measuring intention
that may approximate actual behavior better than traditional measure of generalized 
intention. Intention simulation was measured by captured by asking participants to read 
each case study and respond to three questions, displayed using branching logic driven by 
item response. The first question captured error recognition. Participants were asked to 
decide if an error occurred, with three response categories (Yes, Maybe, No). Individuals 
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answering no, an error did not occur, did not receive the additional questions and the 
survey advanced to the next case study. Individuals answering yes or maybe were
presented with two additional questions and were first asked to make a reporting 
decision, “Would you report this to the appropriate authority, such as an incident 
reporting system or supervisor/manager?”. Responses were assessed on a five-point scale 
(Definitely Yes/Definitely Not) and served as a measure of intention simulation. 
Lastly, participants were asked “Do you think your colleagues would report this 
case to the appropriate authority, such as an incident reporting system or 
supervisor/manager?” assessed on the same five-point scale. This question was added to 
test for the presence of social desirability bias, which is discussed in detail in Chapter V.
Responses to this question were compared with individual responses to determine if 
participants portrayed themselves and their reporting behavior in a more positive manner
than their colleagues. Participants were also provided the opportunity to offer any 
comments, thoughts, or suggestions related to the general topic of reporting medical 
errors in an open-ended comment box.
Pilot Testing
Pilot testing was conducted in two phases. The first round of pilot testing was
designed to find the optimal target number of case studies to minimize response burden.
Four health care professionals (two physicians and two registered nurses) were given nine
case studies to review. Responses from the pilot group indicated six cases as the optimal 
number. All participants preferred the shorter, more concise case studies. A review of the 
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literature on studies utilizing case vignettes found ranges from 1-30 vignettes presented to 
research participants (Livorsi, Comer, Matthias, Perencevich, & Bair, 2016; Martinez et 
al., 2014; Schroder, Behnke, Gastmeier, Schwab, & Geffers, 2015). Given this feedback, 
plus the need to include cases from each error category and level of impact, six case 
studies were selected for inclusion in the final survey. 
A second round of pilot testing on the entire survey instrument was conducted 
with a group of ten local health care professionals. Pilot participants were provided a link 
to the entire survey and asked to provide feedback using six questions recommended by 
Francis et al., (2004, p. 27). Questions included: (1) “Are any items ambiguous or 
difficult to answer?”, (2) “Does the questionnaire feel too repetitive?”, (3) “Does it feel 
too long?”, (4) “Does it feel too superficial?”, (5) “Are there any annoying features of the 
wording or formatting?”, (6) “Are there inconsistent responses that might indicate that 
changes in response endpoints are problematic for respondents who complete the 
questionnaire quickly?”. Responses from the pilot participants indicated several wording 
and formatting issues and included some mild concern over the length of the survey, 
including the use of a seven-point scale. The survey instrument was revised accordingly, 
including the use of a five-point scale.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
This chapter describes the results of the study as executed following the 
methodology outlined in Chapter III. Results of the statistical analyses corresponding to 
each of the research questions are presented and a discussion of these findings and their 
significance to public health follows in Chapter V.
The purpose of this study was to use a theory-driven approach to better
understand the factors that predict error reporting behavior in a sample of health care
professionals. Using the theory of planned behavior (TBP), this study examined the 
relationship between the antecedents of behavior (attitude towards behavior, subjective 
norms, perceived behavioral control) and the intention to report medical errors (a proxy 
for behavior when observing actual behavior is difficult). Psychological safety, a 
construct known to influence reporting behavior, was added to the model as an additional 
predictor variable to increase the explanatory power. Lastly, this study used responses to 
case study scenarios to capture an alternate measure of intention (intention simulation) to 
determine if it improved the predictive utility of the model.
Survey Deployment
The survey went live on October 18, 2018, to a total of 7,604 email addresses. 
Email recipients received an email with a brief introduction to the survey and were
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provided a unique link directing them to the online survey instrument that has housed on 
a Qualtrics® cloud server. The email deployment report provided by DMD indicated 
7,527 (99 percent) of emails were successfully delivered, and 77 (one percent) were 
undeliverable (i.e., hard bounces due to bad mailboxes or bad domains). Response results 
showed 14 percent of delivered emails (n = 1,054) were opened and 1.5 percent (n = 113) 
clicked on the survey URL (see Figure 3). The majority of recipients (74 percent)
engaged with the survey email via a mobile device and only 26 percent used a desktop 
platform. The survey took approximately 13 minutes to complete (M =12.5, SD = 9).
Within seven days of the initial email deployment, DMD sent a second or “echo” email to
non-responders.
DMD provided a detailed tracking report two weeks after the second deployment, 
which summarized the total number of emails that were sent, delivered, opened, and 
clicked. Overall, this study had a 19.24% open rate, meaning that nearly 20% of all 
emails were opened upon delivery. This rate was described as a “fabulous” success by the 
DMD project management team. Further statistics reveal that 13.41% clicked on the 
survey link that was embedded in the survey email, constituting a unique click. These 
statistics were substantially higher than the average unique click rate of 8% promoted by 
DMD in their proposal package. 
Deployment report statistics suggest the campaign topic was interesting and 
enticed the recipient to open the email as evidenced by a high open rate. Results further 
suggest that the majority of participant who opened the email intended to access the 
survey as shown by a unique click rate only slightly lower than the open rate. Compared 
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to industry standards, this email marketing campaign was considered highly successful.
Benchmark data accepts measures of campaign success as open rates between 15% - 25% 
(Campaign Monitor, 2020). Despite a high open rate, the final response rate of this study 
was less than 2 percent, suggesting a significant response bias. This significantly lower 
than expected yield of research responses could have been related to survey topic, 
disinterest, time constraints, or other factors. Future studies should consider a mixed 
methods approach or using funds to incentivize participants to maximize attrition.
Figure 3 
Study Recruitment Flow Chart 
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Survey Response
Qualtrics captured survey progress on 113 health care professionals who clicked 
on the survey URL. Participants completing ≤ 2 percent were excluded (n = 7), as they 
provided no usable data. A total of 106 participants had progress completion rates of 11
percent or greater. No participants had survey progress between three and 10 percent.
Participants with survey progress ≥ 44 percent (n = 91) were deemed to have useful data, 
meaning they completed the majority of questions related to the main study questions. 
The cut-off value of 44 percent was determined by a frequency analysis, which revealed 
rates less than 44 percent had a substantial amount of missing data on all measures. Over
64 percent of participants (n = 72) completed all survey items.
Figure 4
Survey Response Rate 
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Descriptive Statistics
Initial exploration of the data were conducted on 106 participants using SPSS®
version 26 (IBM Corp. SPSS, Released 2018). Frequency statistics included mean, 
standard deviation, and range (see Table 1). Participants included 30 male and 76
females, aged 23 to 77 years (male: M = 55.6, SD = 11.6; female: M = 51.3, SD = 12.2).
The average age of participants was 52.5 years (SD = 12.1). The majority (96 percent)
described themselves as white, with four percent identifying as any other race. Sample
characteristics of participants completing 44 - 100% of survey responses (n = 91) items 
were computed and compared to full sample statistics (n = 106). Results did not 
significantly differ with 26 male and 65 female, average age M = 52.2 years (male: M =
55.0, SD = 12.2; female: M = 51.5, SD = 12.1).
All participants were hospital staffed employees based on predetermined survey 
recruitment filters. Registered nurses (RNs) were the most represented staff position (40
percent), followed by attending/staff physicians (30 percent), nurse practitioners (23
percent), and physician assistants (7 percent). No Licensed Professional Nurses (LPNs) 
completed the survey, and only one medical resident attempted the survey. This
individual completed less than 2 percent of items and was excluded from any analyses.  
Nearly half of the sample (47 percent) reported working in their profession for 21
years or more, compared to 11 percent who had five years or less experience. The
majority of participants (29 percent) had worked at their current hospital or facility 
between one and five years. Primary work area/unit was assessed by asking participants 
to identify the work area, department, or clinical area of the hospital where they spend 
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most of their work time or provide the majority of their clinical services. Medicine (non-
surgical) was the most reported work area, with 37 percent of respondents identified as 
belonging to this quasi catch-all category. The next highest area represented was 
obstetrics (19 percent), followed by surgery (10 percent). The least reported areas were 
the categories of many different units or no specific unit (two percent) and anesthesiology 
(three percent). Other specialties reported were psychiatry/ mental health (seven percent),
emergency department (seven percent), intensive care unit/any type (six percent),
pediatrics (seven percent), and rehabilitation (four percent).
Table 1
Demographic Characteristics of Sample
Factor Sample
N=106
Physicians
n=32
Nurses
n=43
Practitioners
n=31
Age (yrs.) 52.8 53.6 49.1 56.3
Gender (%)
Male
Female
29
71
72
28
7
93
13
87
Race (%)
White
Other
96
4
94
6
98
2
97
3
Years in Position (%)
64
Less than 1 year
1 to 5 years
6 to 10 years
11 to 15 years
16 to 20 years
21 years or more
3
8
8
10
22
48
-
9
13
9
13
56
7
9
2
10
30
42
-
6
13
10
23
48
Primary Work Area/Specialty 
No specific unit
Medicine (non-surgical)
Surgery
Obstetrics
Pediatrics
Emergency Department
Intensive Care Unit
Psychiatry/Mental Health
Anesthesiology
Rehabilitation
2
36
9
18
7
7
6
8
3
4
3
33
17
7
3
13
3
13
7
-
-
17
10
38
4
5
12
5
2
7
3
64
3
3
13
3
-
7
-
3
Years at Hospital (%)
Less than 1 year
1 to 5 years
6 to 10 years
11 to 15 years
16 to 20 years
21 years or more
10
28
16
15
11
20
13
23
23
10
7
24
10
28
14
17
14
17
7
35
10
14
10
24
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Hierarchy
There is a well-established hierarchy in the health care industry. To examine the 
effects of hierarchy, staff positions were ranked and categorized into three hierarchical 
groups (high, mid, low). Attending/staff physicians were considered to be at the top of 
the hierarchy (high) and registered nurses at the bottom (low). Based on a lack of 
consensus in the literature regarding the hierarchical position of physician assistants 
versus nurse practitioners, both occupations were placed into one category under the 
general title of “practitioners” and assigned the mid-position in the overall structure.  
Frequency analysis revealed a relatively uniform distribution of participants 
across the three groups with 30 percent (n = 32) in the high or physician group, 29
percent (n = 31) in the mid or physician assistant/nurse practitioner group, and 41 percent
(n = 43) in the low or registered nurse group. Correlation and multiple regression were 
used to evaluate how well the TPB constructs and psychological safety predicted 
generalized intention scores for each of the three hierarchical groups (physician, 
practitioner, nurse).  
Physician Group:  A correlation matrix between the TPB constructs, 
psychological safety, and intention measures for the physician group found generalized 
intention scores were significantly associated with attitude towards behavior and 
subjective norms. Psychological safety was significantly correlated with intention 
(generalized), attitude, and subjective norms.  The only other significant correlation was 
between intention simulation (i.e. responses from case studies) and attitude scores (r = 
.55).
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Multiple regression was used to predict generalized intention scores for the 
physician group. The model with all four predictors (attitude, subjective norms, perceived 
behavioral control, and psychological safety) produced R² = .589, F(4, 17) = 6.10, p = 
.003. Psychological safety had a significant positive regression weight, indicating 
physicians with higher psychological safety scores (after controlling for the other 
variables in the model) had higher intention scores. This model explained 58.9% of the 
variance in intention scores for the physician in this sample.
Practitioner Group:  A correlation matrix found perceived behavioral control was 
significantly correlated with generalized intention, attitude towards behavior and 
subjective norms. The multiple regression model with all four predictors produced R² = 
.470, F(4, 20) = 4.44, p = .010. This suggests that the model significantly explained 47% 
of the variance in intention scores for the practitioner (physician assistants/nurse 
practitioners) in this sample. Perceived behavioral control had a significant positive 
regression weight, indicating practitioners with higher perceived behavioral control
scores were expected to have higher intention scores.
Nurse Group: A correlation matrix between the TPB constructs and intention 
measures for the nurse found intention was significantly correlated with all TPB 
constructs. Psychological safety also had significant correlations with subjective norms 
and perceived behavioral control. The multiple regression model with all four predictors 
produced R² = .484, F(4, 26) = 6.09, p = .001. Perceived behavioral control and attitude 
towards behavior had a significant positive regression weights, indicating practitioners
with higher perceived behavioral control and attitude scores were expected to have 
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stronger intention scores.  Overall, this model explained 48.4% of the variance in 
intention scores for the nurse group. 
Risk Categorization
Participants were asked to identify a work area or unit where they spend the 
majority of their time administering care. These areas were stratified into risk categories 
based on Kessler, Sage, and Becker’s methodology (Carroll & Buddenbaum, 2013).
High-risk classification was based on malpractice premiums and included five specialties:
emergency medicine, obstetrics/gynecology, anesthesiology, radiology, and surgery. All 
other specialties were categorized as average to low-risk. Based on this classification
strategy, 62 percent of participants (n = 64) reported working in an ‘average to low-risk’
specialty, while 38 percent (n = 39) in high-risk areas. Participants working in high-risk
specialties were more likely to be a registered nurse, specifically working in the field of 
obstetrics.
Past Reporting Behavior
Past reporting behavior was assessed using a question from the AHRQ Hospital 
Survey on Patient Safety. Participants were asked how many errors they had reported 
over the past 12 months. Over half the participants (56 percent) indicated they made no 
reports. The remaining reported between one and two reports (28 percent), three to five
reports (11 percent), six to 10 reports (four percent), and one participant (one percent)
reported making 21 or more reports.  
The number of events were recoded into binary categories based on positive 
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responses, no reports (56 percent) versus one or more reports (45 percent). Participants 
were also asked to report the total number of errors observed or committed over the same 
12-month time period. For this question, 44 percent reported observing or committing no 
errors, one to two errors (34 percent), three to five errors (13 percent), six to 10 errors 
(three percent), 11 to 20 (three percent), and 21 or more errors committed or observed
was reported by the remaining three percent of participants.
Reporting Behavior
A new variable was created using the number of errors reported (numerator) over 
the total number of errors committed or observed (denominator). This calculation
reflected the proportion of time (percent) that an individual reported an error. A total of 
92 participants provided valid answers for both questions. Missing or non-valid data 
(values > 1.0) were observed for n = 21 responses. Values greater than 1.0 reflected more 
errors being reported than were observed/committed and were excluded from this
analysis. Values equal to 1.0 reflect complete agreement, meaning all errors were 
reported. This was observed in 83 percent of the sample. 
Underreporting, determined by values < 1.0, was observed in 17 percent of the 
sample (n = 16). Eleven participants within the underreporting subgroup indicated 
making no error reports. The degree of underreporting varied, with 12 percent of
participants failing to report 11 to 20 errors and 13 percent failing to report 21 or more 
errors. Figure 5 shows a graph of participants responses indicated by the frequency of 
events (not percent) observed or committed against the number of events reported. 
Instances where the reported line (blue line) is greater than the observed or committed 
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line (red line), represent invalid data and are displayed for illustrative purposes. This 
unusual finding suggests participants did not understand the question or were inconsistent 
and perhaps untruthful in answering.  
To assess whether reporting behavior significantly differed across staff position
(i.e. did nurses report more often and accurately than physicians, for example), a chi-
square analysis was conducted. This analysis looked at reporting behavior across the 
three staff position groups (physicians, practitioners, and nurses) with a null hypothesis 
that reporting behavior was independent of position and all groups would report equally. 
Results indicated the assumption of a chi-square analysis had been violated with 33.3
Figure 5
Reporting Behavior: Errors Committed or Observed and Errors Reported
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percent of cells having less than the minimum expected count (>20 percent is considered 
an assumption violation). 
Due to this violation, Fisher’s exact test was used which showed a nonsignificant 
association between reporting behavior and staff position, p = .357, suggesting difference 
between groups were not statistically different. A measure of effect size, Cramer’s V, 
indicated a moderate relationship (V = .25). Looking at the data by position revealed that
physicians had the highest rate of underreporting, with 26 percent receiving a reporting 
scores less than one. Nursing staff followed closely, with an underreporting rate of 20
percent. The practitioner group, which included both nurse practitioners and physician 
assistants, had the lowest rate of underreporting at three percent.
Safety Culture
Participants were asked to describe the safety culture of their work environment.
Patient safety culture was assessed by two measures taken from the AHRQ Hospital 
Survey on Patient Safety Culture. Communication openness measured the degree to 
which staff felt at ease to speak up and question authority on issues of patient safety. A 
descriptive analysis of the data was done and summary scores were converted to 
standardized values to assess for outliers. Two summary scores had Z values less than -3
and were considered outliers, using cutoff values slightly less conservative than +/- 3.29 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). These scores were treated as missing values and excluded 
from further analyses. Overall, the sample had a mean communication score of M = 11.36 
SD = 1.83 out of a maximum score of 15, and was normally distributed.  
An additional measure of safety culture asked participants to grade their 
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hospital/facility using a grading scale from A to F (see Figure 6). The majority of 
hospitals or facilities (88 percent) received a safety rating of excellent (A) or very good 
(B). The remaining scores ranged from acceptable (C; 9 percent), to poor (D; 1 percent),
and, lastly 2 percent gave their hospital a failing grade (F). A crosstabulation of safety 
grade by practitioner group, or hierarchy, found no significant differences between 
groups. Data management revealed poor to failing safety grades were reported by one 
nurse practitioner and two registered nurses.
The relationship between reporting behavior and hospital safety grade was
explored. There was a significant correlation between underreporting and safety rating,
r(79) = .41, p < .001. Participants who underreported medical errors gave their hospital or 
facility lower safety ratings. Poor or failing ratings were provided by eight percent of
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Figure 6
Hospital Safety Grade 
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those who underreported, compared to only three percent in the groups who reported 100
percent of errors. Conversely, 91 percent (n = 61) of participants who reported 100
percent of errors gave a safety rating of very good to excellent, compared to 67 percent of
those who underreported. Safety rating by position was also examined. No significant 
correlations were found; a crosstabulation analysis revealed that the physician group was 
less likely to give their hospital or facility a poor to failing rating compared to the other 
groups.
MEASURES
Reliability Analysis
Cronbach’s alpha, an index of internal consistency, was calculated to establish the 
reliability of each measure (Everitt, 1998). Measures included subscales of the theory of 
planned behavior (intention, attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral 
control), and psychological safety. Items were deleted to improve scale consistency 
where indicated and descriptive statistics are based on finals scales. Intention and attitude
subscales of the theory of planned behavior both demonstrated strong internal 
consistency. Cronbach’s alpha for intention was α = .87 and α = .85 for attitude.
Cronbach’s alpha for the subjective norm subscale was improved by deleting two 
questions (α = .58), and perceived behavior control had the lowest measure of internal 
consistency (α = .44). Cronbach’s alpha for the psychological safety scale (α = .82) was 
strong. Internal consistency for the communication openness scale was improved (α =
.71) by deleting one question.
Despite the removal of questions to improve scale consistency, reliabilities were 
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still lower than anticipated. An editorial by Ajzen (2011) described the limits of the 
predictive utility of the TPB, stating that reliability coefficients in excess of 0.75 are 
rarely observed and values around 0.6 are more realistic. Lower correlation coefficients 
(0.40 – 0.57) were reported in a meta-analysis by Rivis & Sheeran (2003), suggesting the 
results of this study are consistent with published data. 
Psychological Safety
Psychological safety summary scores were calculated to assess if participants felt 
safe taking interpersonal risks on their workplace team (or unit). Low scores were 
reflective of poor psychological safety and suggested participants did not feel safe 
engaging in interpersonally risky behavior. Data were explored for normality and 
outliers. Summary scores were converted to Z score, and values greater than 3 or less 
than -3 were considered outliers. Based on this criteria, one data point was excluded from 
the analysis. Data were found to be negatively skewed, and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
of normality indicated that psychological safety summary scores did not follow a normal 
distribution, D(81) = .11, p = .02. Given the sample size of this study, a violation of 
normality was not considered problematic (Ghasemi & Zahediasl, 2012).
Psychological safety raw scores were stratified into three levels (high, moderate,
low). Low scores were defined as -1 SD, and high scores were +1SD. Overall, 
participants (75 percent) reported moderate levels of psychological safety (M = 26, SD =
5.5). Psychological summary scores were examined by practitioner group (physicians, 
practitioners, nurses). Practitioners (physician assistants and nurse practitioners) reported 
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the highest psychological safety (M = 27.84, SD = 4.17). Nurses (M = 25.28, SD = 6.14)
and physicians (M = 25.17, SD = 5.65) had very similar scores. A one-way ANOVA 
found no significant differences between the groups, F(2, 79) = 1.96, p =.15.
Psychological safety summary scores were also compared between health care
professionals working in high-risk (M = 26.16, SD = 5.97) versus moderate/low risk (M =
25.90, SD = 5.26) specialties using an independent samples t-test and no significant 
differences were found (p = .84). Psychological safety was correlated with several 
variables, including the safety culture subscale scores of communication openness, r(79)
= .41, p <.001 and safety grade ratings, r(82) = .53, p <.001. Psychological safety was
highly correlated with the intention to report (r = .24, p = .029), meaning the intention to 
report increased as psychological safety increased and was also significantly correlated 
with attitude toward the behavior (r = .31, p =. 005) and subjective norms (r = .33, p =
.002). The correlation between perceived behavioral control and psychological safety was 
not significant.
Theory of Planned Behavior
The theory of planned behavior predictor variables included behavioral attitude, 
subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, and intention.  A correlation matrix
showed all variables were significantly correlated with intention, with several other 
correlations significant at the p <.001 level (see Table 2).
75
Table 2
Correlations between TPB Constructs & Intention to Report
Measure 1 2 3 4
Intention ___
Attitude .459** ___
Subjective Norms .484** .491** ___
Perceived Behavioral    
Control
.519** .199 .378** ___
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Intention summary scores ranged from 3 to 15, with a mean score of M = 13.24.
Higher scores reflected a stronger intention to report.  Over half of the sample (54.4
percent) had an intention summary score of 15, which was the maximum score possible. 
This likely represents a ceiling effect and suggests the presence of a social desirability 
bias. Intention scores did not significantly differ across positions F(2, 86) = 1.36, p = .26.
Nurses and practitioners had nearly identical scores, M = 13.43 (SD = 2.67) and M =
13.63 (SD = 2.65), while physician intention scores were lower (M = 12.52, SD = 2.43).
Subjective norm summary scores ranged from 3 to 10, with a mean score of M =
7.77, SD = 1.8.  Higher scores reflected increased social pressure to report from 
important people. The one-way ANOVA, F(2, 86) = 3.46, p = .036 demonstrated
statistically significant differences in subjective norm scores across positions. Tukey post 
hoc testing revealed that nurses reported greater social pressure to report errors (M =
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8.19, SD = 1.83) compared to physicians (M = 7.0, SD = 1.81). Subjective norm summary 
scores for the practitioner group were M = 7.89, SD = 1.72.
Table 3
TPB Predictors Summary Scores
Predictor Variables N M (SD)
Intention 90 13.24 (2.6)
Behavioral Attitude 88 13.83 (1.76)
Subjective Norm
90 7.77 (1.83)
Perceived Behavioral Control
90 8.34 (1.57)
An analysis was conducted on the survey item assessing subjective norms of a 
descriptive nature. Descriptive norms measure what important people actually do versus 
what people think they should do (injunctive norms). Nearly 60 percent of the sample 
endorsed that people important to them (in the work environment) actually report errors,
while over 20 percent strongly indicated their peers do not report. When examined across 
groups, noteworthy differences emerged between nurses and physicians. Only 31 percent 
of physicians agreed (somewhat or strongly) that their colleagues (or people in the 
workplace who are important to them) actually reported medical errors. This is compared 
to nurses and practitioners, which were both close to 60 percent actual engagement in 
reporting behavior by peers. Differences in the percent that endorsed (somewhat or 
strongly) that their peers would not report across groups were not statistically significant. 
The practitioner group indicated less than 10 percent of peers do not actually engage in 
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reporting, compared to 21 percent of nurses, and 27 percent of physicians. Physicians 
were disinclined at a much higher rate than nurses and practitioners to infer or pass
judgement on the behavior of their peers, as evidenced by close to 35 percent choosing 
not to respond. 
Behavioral Attitude summary scores ranged from 3 to 15, with a mean score of M
= 13.83, SD = 1.76. Higher scores reflected a more positive attitude towards reporting. 
Significant differences were found between groups using ANOVA, F (2, 84) = 11.12, p <
.001. Physicians reported a significantly lower or more negative attitudes (p < .001)
towards reporting medical errors (M = 12.56, SD = 2.47) compared to nurses (M = 14.29, 
SD = 1.07) or practitioners (M = 14.41, SD = 1.05).  
Perceived behavioral control summary scores ranged from 3 to 10, with a mean 
score of M = 8.34. Higher scores represented a greater level of control over the behavior 
of reporting errors. An ANOVA revealed no significant differences between groups, F
(2,86) = .10, p = .907. Mean scores were uniform across groups, physicians (M = 8.31, 
SD = 1.62), nurses (M = 8.33, SD = 1.62), and practitioners (M = 8.48, SD = 1.48).
Two questions were asked to get at actual behavioral control. Participants were 
asked if they knew how to report a medical error and if they knew what kind of errors to 
report. A majority of participants (87 percent) indicated knowing what type of errors to 
report, and 89 percent reported knowing how to report. A bivariate correlation between 
the two variables was strong (r = .78) and significant at the p < 0.001 value. Only seven
percent of participants indicated not knowing how to report, nine percent did not know 
what type to report, and four percent marked unsure on both questions. 
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Participants received a score for knowing both how and what to report. A 
frequency analysis showed nearly three fourths of the sample (74 percent) received a 
perfect score. In contrast, 9 percent of participants (n = 8) received a failing score (≤ 50
percent). A breakdown of the data revealed those receiving a failing score were either a 
nurse (67 percent) or nurse practitioner (33 percent). All physicians and physician 
assistants in this study received a perfect score. Registered nurses were the only 
respondents who reported mixed yes/no responses. Crosstab analysis of procedural 
reporting knowledge scores by position showed no significant association between 
groups.
Intention Simulation
Intention simulation methodology required participants to make a behavioral 
(yes/no) decision.  Participants were asked to read a case study and decide if an error had 
occurred, and if so, whether they would report it. The number of “yes” answers were 
tabulated and served as an intention simulation score. Higher scores reflected a stronger 
intention to report. All cases contained reportable errors. The mean intention simulation 
score for the sample was M = 5.03, SD = 1.15, out of a possible six points maximum.  
Over 64 percent of respondents completed all six case studies. 
Results of a one-way ANOVA revealed statistically significantly differences 
between positions, F(2, 56) = 4.33, p = .02. Post hoc testing identified significant 
differences between physicians and nurses (p = .02). Intention simulation scores for 
physicians were significantly lower (M = 4.39, SD = 1.61) compared to nurses (M = 5.33, 
SD = .70).  No statistically significant differences were found in intention simulation 
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scores between the three levels of psychological safety, F(2, 57) = 0.81, p = .45.
Participants (n = 9) working in environments with low psychological safety had lower 
mean intention simulation scores (M = 4.89, SD = 1.45) compared to those (n = 44) in 
environments with moderate psychological safety (M = 5.14, SD = .979) and those (n = 
7) in environments with high psychological safety (M = 4.57, SD = 1.72).
Given that not all participants completed all six case studies, a posthoc power 
analysis was conducted using G*Power to assess whether this portion of the study was 
adequately powered to detect significance differences. Results indicated the study was 
powered at the 0.60 level, with a total sample size of 72, three groups, and a 0.3 effect 
size. The lack of power for this section of the study should be noted as a significant 
limitation and results should be interpreted with care. 
Colleague Intention Simulation
In absence of a formal measure of Social Desirability Bias (SDB), participants 
were asked to state whether they believed their colleagues would report the error outlined
in each case study. SDB would be considered present if participants reported their 
behavioral intentions in a more positive manner than prevailing social norms. The
number of “yes” answers were tabulated and served as the colleague intention simulation 
score. Mean scores for colleague intention simulation were M = 4.60, SD = 1.48.
Correlation between the two intention simulation scores (self and colleague) was 
significant, r(60) =.768, p < .001. Colleague intention simulation scores were examined 
by position to assess for any hierarchical differences. A oneway ANOVA found 
significant differences in scores between positions, F(2,56) = 3.01, p = .05). Scores were 
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the lowest for physicians (M = 3.94, SD. = 1.80) compared to practitioners (M = 4.65, SD
= 1.17) and nurse (M = 5.04, SD. = 1. 30). Across the board, all practitioners reported
their behavioral intention to report in a more positive manner than their colleagues, 
suggesting the presence of SDB. Figure 7 shows the difference between measures of 
intention simulation to highlight the degree to which participants reported their behavior 
more favorably than their colleagues. These results highly suggest the presence of social 
desirability bias was present in this study.
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Figure 7
Intention to Report Medical Errors: Perceptions of Self and Colleague Behavior
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No significant differences were found in intention scores across the three levels of 
psychological safety. Participants working in environments with low psychological safety 
had lower mean colleague intention simulation scores (M = 4.11, SD = 2.21) compared to 
those in environments with moderate psychological safety (M = 4.73, SD = 1.26) and 
high environments (M = 4.43, SD = 1.72). Table 8 provides a summary of responses 
(percent) to each question (error recognition, intention simulation, colleague intention
simulation) across all six case studies. 
Table 4
Participant Responses to Case Studies 
Error Occur?
(%)
Self-Report?
(%)
Colleague Report?
(%)
Yes No/Maybe Yes No/Unsure Yes No/Unsure
Case #1 92 8 81 19 73 27
Case #2 72 28 74 26 60 40
Case #3 100 - 97 3 95 5
Case #4 54 46 70 30 58 42
Case #5 77 23 83 17 77 23
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Case #6 99 1 99 1 96 4
Correct Decision Scores
A correct decision score was calculated from participant responses to the case 
study scenarios. A correct decision was awarded to individuals who answered yes to both 
questions asking if an error occurred and if they would report it. Individuals who 
answered yes - an error had occurred, but indicated they would not report the error were 
coded as making an incorrect decision. Participants who answered negatively, that they 
did not believe an error had occurred, were marked as an incorrect decision.  Average 
correct decision score was M = 4.4, SD = 1.32. Slightly over one quarter of the sample 
made the correct decision in all six cases. In contrast, over half the sample received 
failing scores of 67 percent or below. Scores were consistent across the three groups; 
physicians (M = 4.04, SD = 1.49), practitioners (M = 4.41, SD = 1.14), and nurses (M =
4.59, SD = 1.29). Decision scores by position can be seen in Table 9.
Table 5
Correct Decision Scores (1-100%)
Physician (%) Nurse (%) Practitioner (%)
100% (6/6) 26 28 18
83% (5/6) 9 31 32
<67% - Failing 65 41 50
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Multiple linear regression analyses were used to answer the following research 
questions and corresponding hypotheses. All assumptions of linear regression were 
evaluated and fulfilled as described in the methods sections prior to data analysis. Results 
are as follows:
Question 1
Research Question 1(a) – What is the relationship between attitude towards behavior, 
subjective norms, perceived behavioral control and the intention to report medical errors?
Hypothesis 1: The theory of planned behavior will significantly predict the 
intention to report medical errors. 
Results: Regression model statistically significantly explained 41.4% of the 
variance in intention scores, R2 = .414, F(3, 82) = 19.31, p <. 001. 
Decision: Null hypothesis was not rejected.  
The first research question (1a) evaluated the relationship between the theory of 
planned behavior’s antecedents of behavior (attitude towards behavior, subjective norms, 
and perceived behavioral control) and the intention to report medical errors using 
multiple linear regression. A scatterplot of predicted standardized regression values (x-
axis) and standardized regression residual values (y-axis) did not show violations of 
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homoscedasticity, independence, or linearity. Variance inflation factor (VIF) values were 
within acceptable ranges (1.04 -1.48) for all independent variables, suggesting no issues 
with multicollinearity.
Model statistics indicated the three antecedents of behavior explained 41.4
percent of the variance in intention scores, R2 = .414, F(3, 82) = 19.31, p < 001. Attitude 
towards behavior (β = .44, p = .003) and perceived behavioral control (β = .64, p < .001)
were significant predictor variables. The construct of subjective norms, made up of 
injunctive and descriptive norms, was not a significant predictor. Although zero-order 
correlations were highly significant (r = .484, p < .001), part and partial correlations 
revealed the correlation was substantially reduced when controlling for attitude and 
perceived behavioral control, r = .134.  
Research Question 1(b) – Does the inclusion of additional predictor variables explain 
additional variance in intention scores?
Hypothesis 2: Inclusion of background variables, past reporting behavior, and 
actual behavioral control to the TPB model will significantly predict intention 
scores.  
Results: Regression model was statistically significant in explaining 53.3% of the 
variance in intention scores, R2 = .53, F(8, 69) = 9.86, p <. 001.
Decision: Null hypothesis was not rejected
A second model was constructed to determine if including additional background
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predictor variables would increase the explanatory power of the model. In the first step
actual behavioral control (knowing how and what to report) was added and found to be a 
significant predictor variable, adding an additional six percent in explained variance, R2 =
.474, F(4, 77) = 17.31, p <. 001. To further improve model statistics, additional 
background factors of age, position, risk, and reporting behavior were added. This final 
model contained eight predictor variables and explained 53.3 percent of the variance in 
intention to report medical errors, R2 = .533, F(8, 69) = 9.86, p <. 001 (see Table 4).
Table 6
Results of the Multiple Linear Regression Analyses
Variable t p β F df p R2
Constant 9.86 8,69 <.001 .533
Attitude 3.01 .004 .458
Subjective Norms 1.30 .199 .198
Perceived Behavioral Control 3.26 .002 .560
Actual Behavioral Control 2.84 .006 1.19
Risk Grouping .045 .965 .021
Age .805 .423 .017
Position/Hierarchy .474 .637 .146
Past Reporting Behavior 2.29 .025 .028
*Intention (Generalized) as the criterion variable
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Question 2
Research Question 2(a) – What is the Relationship between Psychological Safety and 
Reporting Behavior?
Hypothesis 1: Psychological safety will be a significant predictor of the intention 
to report medical errors. 
Results: Psychological safety explained 6% of the variance in intention scores, R2
= .06, F(1, 78) = 4.95, p =. 029. 
Decision: Null hypothesis was not rejected  
The second research question evaluated the relationship between psychological 
safety and the intention to report medical errors. A correlation matrix was constructed to 
examine the relationship between psychological safety and the constructs of the theory of 
planned behavior. Results demonstrated that psychological safety was significantly 
correlated with intention (r = .244, p <.05), subjective norms (r = .343, p < .001), and
attitude (r = .31, p < .001) (see Table 5). A simple linear regression examined the 
proportion of variance in intention that could be explained from psychological safety 
scores. Results showed that psychological safety predicted six percent of the variance in 
intention, R2 = .06, F(1,78) = 4.95, p = .029.
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Table 7
Correlations between Psychological Safety & TPB Constructs
Measure 1 2 3 4 5
Psychological Safety ___
Intention .244* ___
Subjective Norms .343** .484** ___
Attitude .312** .459** .491** ___
Perceived Behavioral
Control
.186 .519** .378** .199 ___
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Research Question 2(b) – What is the relationship between TPB antecedents of 
behavior, psychological safety, and the intention to report medical errors?
Hypothesis 2: The inclusion of psychological safety as an additional predictor 
variable in the theory of planned behavior will significantly improve explanatory 
power of the model.
Results: Regression model was statistically significant in predicting intention 
scores, explaining 36.9% of the variance in intention scores. However, 
psychological safety was not a significant predictor. 
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis
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Research question (2b) evaluated the relationship between the antecedents of 
behavior, psychological safety, and the intention to report. Linear regression model 
statistics were statistically significant in predicting intention scores, explaining 36.9% of 
the variance in intention scores, R2 = .369, F(4,74) = 10.82, p = <.001. However, 
psychological safety was not a significant predictor as evidenced by low and 
nonsignificant coefficients (β = .01, p = .78).
Research Question 2(c) – Does the inclusion of psychological safety in an expanded 
model explain additional variance in intention scores?
Hypothesis 3: Inclusion psychological safety in an expanded model of the TPB 
would significantly predict intention scores.
Results: Regression model statistically significant. Explained 47.9% of the 
variance in intention scores, R2 = .414, F(9, 61) = 6.22, p <. 001. However, 
psychological safety was not a significant predictor. 
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis 
A second regression model integrating the constructs of the theory of planned 
behavior explained 43.4 percent of variance in intention scores, R2 = .434, F(5,69) = 
10.59, p = <.001. Constructs of behavioral attitude (β = .54, p = .001), perceived 
behavioral control (β = .59, p = .002), and actual behavioral control (β = 1.25, p = .005), 
contributed significantly to the model statistics (see Figure 7).
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Question 3
Research Question 3 – How does psychological safety influence the intention to report?
Hypothesis 1: Psychological safety will independently influence the intention to 
report errors.
Results: A Baron & Kenny analysis did not find evidence of mediation. 
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis 
Figure 8
Regression Path Analysis 
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Research Question 3 used the Baron and Kenny (1986) approach to evaluate if
psychological safety served as a mediator or moderator in the relationship between the 
theory of planned behavior constructs and the intention to report. Subjective norms were
the first construct examined in the mediation analysis. The initial step regressed
subjective norm scores on intention, without the mediator (psychological safety); this 
regression was significant, b = .689, t(87) = 5.16, p = <.001. 
The second step showed that the regression of subjective norms on the mediator, 
psychological safety, was significant, b = 1.05, t(78) = 3.23, p = .002. The third step
showed that the regression of the mediator, controlling for subjective norm, on intention 
was not significant, b = .050, t(76) = .994, p = .324.  In the fourth step, psychological 
safety was assessed as a mediator in the relationship between subjective norms and 
intention. Subjective norm scores remained a significant predictor of intention scores, b =
.568, t(76) = 3.65, p = <.001, when the effects of psychological safety were controlled. 
Evidence of mediation would have shown a significant reduction. A Sobel test did not 
confirm the existence of mediation of psychological safety on the relationship between 
subjective norms and the intention (z = .935, p = .350).
Perceived behavioral control was the second construct examined in the mediation 
analysis. The initial step regressed perceived behavioral control on intention, without the 
mediator (psychological safety); this regression was significant, b = .856, t(87) = 5.67, p
= <.001. The second step showed that the regression of perceived behavioral control on 
the mediator, psychological safety, was not significant, b = .693, t(78) = 1.67, p = .099.
The third step showed that the regression of the mediator, controlling for perceived 
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behavioral control, was also not significant, b = .077, t(76) = 1.61, p = .113. The fourth 
step assessed whether psychological safety completely mediated the relationship between 
perceived behavioral control and intention. Perceived behavioral control remained a
significant predictor of intention scores, b = .718, t(76) = 4.06, p = <.001, suggesting no 
mediation.  A Sobel test was conducted and did not find mediation (z = 1.15, p = .251). 
Attitude was the third and final construct of the theory of planned behavior tested
for mediation. The initial step regressed attitude on intention, without the mediator 
(psychological safety); this regression was significant, b = .672, t(85) = 4.76, p < .001.
The second step showed that the regression of attitude on the mediator was significant, b
= .99, t(79) = 2.92, p = .005. The third step showed that the regression of the mediator, 
controlling for attitude, was not significant, b = .05, t(77) = 1.00, p = .320. Step Four of
the analyses revealed that, controlling for the mediator (psychological safety), attitude 
scores were still a significant predictor of intention scores, b = .64, t(76) = 4.10, p =
<.001.  A Sobel test confirmed there was no mediation (z = .95, p = .344). 
To test the hypothesis that the intention to report medical errors is a function of 
multiple risk factors, and more specifically whether psychological safety moderates the 
relationship between subjective norms and intention, a hierarchical multiple regression 
analysis was conducted. The first model included the variables of subjective norms and
psychological safety. These variables accounted for a significant amount of variance in 
intention, R2 = .198, F(2, 76) = 9.41, p < .001. Next, the interaction term between 
subjective norms and psychological safety was added to the regression model, which did
not account for a significant proportion of the variance in intention, ΔR2 = .036, ΔF(1, 
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75) = 3.55, p = .57. The effect of subjective norms on intention was positive and
significant (b = .50, s.e. = .16, p = .002), however, the effect of psychological safety was 
not significant (b = .03, s.e. = .05, p = .502). This suggests that psychological safety was 
not a significant moderator of the effects of subjective norms on intention.  
A second hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted to test whether
psychological safety moderated the relationship between perceived behavioral control 
and intention. Perceived behavioral control and psychological safety accounted for a 
significant amount of variance in intention scores, R2 = .226, F(2, 76) = 11.11, p < .001.
The interaction term between perceived behavioral control and psychological safety was 
added to the regression model, which did not account for a significant proportion of the 
variance in intention, ΔR2 = .024, ΔF(1, 75) = 2.37, p = .128, (b = .04, s.e. = .03, t(75) = 
1.54, p = .128. The effect of perceived behavioral control on intention was positive and 
significant (b = .77, s.e. = .18, p < .001. The effect of psychological safety was positive, 
but not significant (b = .09, s.e. = .05, p = .05). This suggests that psychological safety 
was not a significant moderator of the effects of perceived behavioral control on 
intention.
A third and final hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted to
examine the relationship between attitude and intention. Attitude and psychological 
safety accounted for a significant amount of variance in intention scores, R2 = .228, F(2, 
77) = 11.39, p < .001. The interaction term did not account for a significant proportion of
the variance in intention, ΔR2 = .003, ΔF(1, 76) = .329, p = .57, (b = -.01, s.e. = .02, t(76)
= -.57, p = .568.  The effect of attitude on intention was positive and significant (b = .59,
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s.e. = .18, p = .002.  The effect of psychological safety was positive, but not significant (b
= .05, s.e. = .05, p = .342).  This suggests that psychological safety was not a significant 
moderator of the effects of attitude on intention.
Question 4
Research Question 4 – Can an alternative measure of intention better approximate actual 
behavior?
Hypothesis 1: Intention simulation will serve as a better proxy for actual behavior 
than generalized intention in predicting error reporting behavior.
Results: Intention simulation did not perform better than generalized intention in
any regression models.
Decision: Reject the null hypothesis 
The final research question looked to assess if a measure of intention simulation 
would serve as a better proxy for actual behavior compared to the more commonly used 
measure of generalized intention. Bivariate correlations between intention simulation and 
generalized intention were not significant, r(60) = .10, p = .45. A correlation matrix was 
constructed to examine the associations between intention simulation, the constructs of 
the theory of planned behavior, and psychological safety. Significant associations shown
in table 7 were found between intention simulation and attitude (p < .001) and subjective 
norms (p = .012). 
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Table 8
Correlations between TPB Constructs & Intention Simulation
Measure 1 2 3 4 5
Intention Simulation ___
Subjective Norms .323* ___
Attitude .533** .491** ___
Perceived Behavioral    
Control
.147 .378** .199 ___
Psychological Safety .090 .343** .312** .186 ___
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Linear regression was used to test how well the constructs of the theory of 
planned behavior predicted intention simulation. Model statistics indicated the three 
predictors variables explained 28.9 percent of the variance in intention simulation scores 
(R2 = .289, F(3,56) = 7.58, p <. 001). Attitude towards behavior (β = .50, p = < .001) was
the only significant predictor. Additional background factors of age, position, risk 
grouping, and reporting behavior were added to the final model that contained eight
predictor variables and explained 31.5 percent of the variance in intention to report 
medical errors, R2 = .315, F(8, 44) = 2.52, p = .024.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Reporting can be conceptualized as a complex health behavior that requires 
individuals to both self-incriminate and hold accountable their colleagues and superiors 
in the name of patient safety. Using a well-established model of human behavior, this
theory-driven study aimed to better understand medical error reporting behavior in a 
random sample of health care professionals licensed in the state of Kentucky. This
chapter expands on the findings from Chapter IV and is followed by a discussion of the 
limitations and broader public health implications.
Discussion of Research Findings 
The results indicated that conceptualizing reporting (or the intention to report)
through the constructs of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) explained a significant 
proportion of the variance in an individual’s intention to report medical errors and
revealed the relative importance and significance of each predictor variable. Results did 
not support the addition of psychological safety to the model as it did not significantly 
improve the explanatory power of the model. Lastly, the use of an alternate measure of 
behavioral intention, intention simulation, derived from case study scenarios did not 
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serve as a better proxy for actual behavior as evidenced by reduced model statistics. The 
following is a discussion of these results and their implications for public health.
The participants in this study represented a self-selected sample of health care
providers licensed to practice in the state of Kentucky and included physicians, nurses, 
nurse practitioners, and physician assistants. Nurses made up the majority (40 percent) of 
the sample, followed by physicians (30 percent), while nurse practitioners and physician 
assistants were grouped into a third category for comparison. An important outcome of
this study was to better understand the influence of hierarchy on reporting behavior, both 
between and within groups. However, for reasons that are unclear, no licensed practical 
nurses (LPNs) participated in the study, despite being included in the sampling pool.
LPNs are lower status employees and are likely to spend the majority of work time on the 
floor; perhaps their lack of participation was due to having less access to a computer 
during the workday. This study also did not offer any incentive for survey completion, 
which may have further precluded participation. Similarly, only one medical 
resident/fellow attempted the study, making any within group differences difficult to
explore.  
The study met the minimum required sample size of (N = 85) to adequately power 
the study. A priori power analyses recommended a sample size of 85 and roughly 91
participants were included in the primary analyses. Survey response rates were lower
than expected and suggest that alternative recruitment strategies may be more cost 
effective. An email marketing company approach to study recruitment was intended to 
mitigate threats of risk related to disclosing sensitive or personal information by making 
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the survey completely anonymous and random. This approach was also intended to 
mitigate social desirability bias, Future studies should explore a mix of electronic, paper, 
and phone surveys with adequate follow up to improve response rates in the busy 
population. 
Questions about past reporting behavior revealed that 56 percent of participants 
made no reports during the past 12 months. These results were similar to data published 
in the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality’s (AHRQ) comparative database 
which report 55 percent of all participants made no reports. A rate of underreporting,
obtained by asking participants how many errors they committed or observed over the 
same 12 months, showed nearly 20 percent did not report an error when in fact they 
should have. Physicians had the highest rate of underreporting at 26 percent, followed by 
nurses. These numbers are dramatically higher than published data that reports pervasive 
rates of underreporting in excess of 90 percent. These differences suggest the presence of 
a strong social desirability bias, and therefore, results should be interpreted with care. 
Research Questions
The first research question explored in the relationship between the antecedents of 
behavior and the intention to report medical errors. Linear regression techniques were
used to build a model that showed the proportion of variance in intention explained by 
the predictor variables of attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. 
The model accounted for 41.4 percent of variance in intention scores, slightly above the 
19 to 40 percent range reported by a meta-review of over 200 data sets (Rivis & Sheeran, 
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2003). Perceived behavioral control and attitude were stronger predictors than normative 
beliefs. The addition of other variables, including background factors, increased the 
explanatory power of the final regression model to 53.3 percent.
The second research question explored the relationship between psychological 
safety and intention. Considered alone, psychological safety predicted six percent of the 
variance in intention. However, when psychological safety was added to the larger TPB 
regression model, the coefficient of determination decreased from 53.3 percent to 47.9
percent. Model coefficients confirmed psychological safety was not a significant 
predictor (p = .994) in the full regression model.
These findings suggested psychological safety may be redundant with the TPB's 
existing predictors, working through constructs such as behavioral attitude, which was 
significantly correlated with psychological safety, r(81) = .312, p = .005, or subjective 
norms, r(80) = .343, p = .002, as predicted by Ajzen (2006). These results were 
unexpected given the strong links between psychological safety, culture and reporting 
behavior; a strong predictive relationship was anticipated. Although the effects of 
psychological safety were not actualized in this study, responses to open-ended 
comments suggest it is alive and present. A 58-year-old, obstetric physician said, “Your 
questions are too limiting and don't reflect what is going on in the real world of 
medicine”. A 64-year-old psychiatric nurse practitioner said “There is a lot of retaliation 
towards those who speak up or document their concerns”. Another nurse wrote, “I was
fired in retaliation for my numerous reports of substandard patient care, with my 
employer”.
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Limitations
There are limitations to this study that must be acknowledged and taken into 
consideration when interpreting the results. The first limitation is a potential sampling 
bias. An outside health care marketing company was hired to help recruit a random
sample of healthcare professionals. Hiring a marketing company allowed for a targeted 
email campaign and included access to the AMA Physician Masterfile that would have 
otherwise been unavailable. Random sampling occurred within this population
framework, which may not be a true representation of the population of interest. 
Individuals who opt-in to receive email solicitations may have meaningful differences (in 
respect to reporting errors) compared to those who opt-out of receiving such 
notifications. These differences may influence the way in which participants responded to 
the questions, introducing response bias. This study did not provide compensation for 
participation, which may have precluded individuals who were interested in taking the 
survey, but not willing or able to commit their time and effort. Moreover, the health care
professionals who responded to this study may just be more intrinsically motivated 
towards patient safety compared to those who chose not to respond.  
Social Desirability Bias 
The presence of a social desirability bias is suspected in this study and its 
influence on the data merits discussion. This study asked questions that have the potential 
to be self-incriminating and/or embarrassing. Answering these questions truthfully could,
therefore, be considered risky to individuals who fear retaliation or repercussions.  
Although efforts were taken to ensure confidentiality and anonymity, it is possible that 
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participants answered questions in a manner which portrayed themselves favorably. This
bias is most suspected in the rate of underreporting observed in this study, which was 
considerably lower (17 percent) than previous studies (80-90 percent) (Barach & Small, 
2000). This difference was not unexpected; the methodology used in published studies,
including retrospective record reviews and software mining tools, was superior at finding 
actual reporting behavior, while this study relied on self-reports in hypothetical 
situations. The extent to which these values differed, however, was unexpected.  An
article by Fisher (1993) stated that the extent to which social desirability bias influences a 
response reflects the relevant importance of that value within society. This would suggest 
participants in this study placed high importance on their role in patient safety. 
Additional limitations included the use of self-report measures and a lengthy
survey. Self-report measures have well-known limitations, but are critical to behaviors 
that are otherwise unobservable (Garcia & Gustavson, 2000). Although the survey took 
on average 15 minutes to complete, several participants left open-ended comments stating 
they felt the survey was too long. The response burden associated with completing this 
study was projected to be in the responses to the case studies in the second section of the 
survey, which required participants to process technical information and make clinical 
judgements. Response fatigue was observed in this study through both direct comments 
and a steady decline in responses to the case study scenarios. 
There are also published limitations and warnings about attempting a measure of 
intention simulation, instructing researchers to “[prepare] with great care, or it may be 
misleading” (Jones, Gerrity, & Earp, 1990). Collecting a measure of intention simulation 
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was a secondary aim of this research study, therefore, previously published case study 
vignettes were used. Although these case studies are well-validated, they do not conform 
to the exact specifications outline by Francis (2004). Given these conditions the results of 
intention simulation analyses should be interpreted with caution. Post hoc power analysis 
confirmed the case study section of the study was not adequately powered to detect 
significant differences with power = .0.60.
Conclusions and Future Directions
Medical errors are a public health epidemic and a major threat to patient safety
and for reasons unclear, they do not get much attention in public health. The overarching 
goal of this study was to better understand the predictors of error reporting as to inform 
interventions for improved reporting and ultimately reduce medical errors. Reporting 
allows for errors, and the conditions in which they occur, to be identified and corrected. 
Reporting turns a threat into an opportunity for a corrective action.
This study used the TPB to investigate the influence of behavioral attitude, 
subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, and psychological safety on the intention 
to report medical errors. With the inclusion of background factors, over 53 percent of the
variance in reporting behavior was explained by the model. Correlation and regression 
analysis found that perceived behavioral control was the most influential on the intention 
to report, followed closely by attitude towards behavior. Although results of statistical 
analyses did not find psychological safety to be a significant predictor, its role in error 
reporting behavior does warrant additional consideration. Results suggest significant 
ceiling effects resulting from social desirability bias, which appeared to be present in 
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other areas as well, such as error reporting behavior. 
Additional efforts to improve model statistics through the use of a novel measure 
of intention simulation did not result in any improvements. Future studies looking to use 
intention simulation as a proxy for behavior should follow the conceptual analysis review 
recommendations and warnings by Jones, Gerrity, and Earp (1990) very closely to be 
sure the results are valid. This study used existing validated case studies in place of
developing unique scenarios, a strategy that did not result in improve model statistics.
This study also examined the influence of hierarchy on the intention to report.  
The health care industry has a deep-seated power structure and workers face a steep
authority gradient when reporting. The results of this study suggest hierarchical 
differences were present but not fully revealed. Future studies should explore within 
group differences, looking at the hierarchical structure and norms within each profession,
as well as institutional barriers.
Efforts to flatten the hierarchy, similar to steps taken by the aviation industry, 
could be transformative. However, none of these changes will be actualized unless all 
systems and clinicians value reporting enough to increase its occurrence. This study 
supports previous studies that suggest physicians are slightly disengaged from this 
behavior. Understanding the reasons and finding ways to involve physicians will be 
essential in safeguarding the health of the public through the reduction of medical errors.
The airline industry did not transform their safety record without the full leadership and 
engagement of pilots.
Twenty plus years has passed since the Institute of Medicine published the To Err 
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is Human report and the problems persist. Rigorous efforts to build a safer health system 
must identify and address the conditions that discourage healthcare professionals from 
reporting medical errors and turn these threats into opportunities to save hundreds of 
thousands of lives.
– You cannot fix that which is unknown
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Reporting Medical Errors 
Survey Instrument
#Q’s Source
7 Background/Demographics 
Gender
a) Male
b) Female
c) Other ___
Age _____
Race (check all that apply)
a) White
b) Black or African American
c) Asian
d) American Indian or Alaska Native
e) Pacific Islander or Native Hawaiian
f) Other
CDC
What is your profession/position?
a) Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN)
b) Registered Nurse
c) Nurse Practitioner
d) Physician Assistant
e) Attending/Staff Physician
f) Resident or Fellow
AHQR  
Section 
H4
(modified)
130
How long have you worked in your current 
specialty or profession?
a) less than 1 year
b) 1 to 5 years
c) 6 to 10 years
d) 11 to 15 years
e) 16 to 20 years
f) 21 years or more
AHQR  
Section 
H6
In this survey, think of your “unit” as the 
work area, department, or clinical area where 
you spend most of your work time or 
provide most of your clinical services. 
What is your primary work area or unit? 
a) Many different hospital units/No specific
unit
b) Medicine (non-surgical)
c) Surgery
d) Obstetrics
e) Pediatrics
f) Emergency department
g) Intensive care unit (any type)
h) Psychiatry/mental health
i) Rehabilitation
j) Pharmacy
k) Laboratory
l) Radiology
) m) Anesthesiology
n) Other, please specify________
AHRQ  
Section A
How long have you worked in this hospital 
or facility?
a) less than 1 year
b) 1 to 5 years
AHQR  
Section 
H1
131
c) 6 to 10 years
d) 11 to 15 years
e) 16 to 20 years
f) 21 years or more
2 Reporting Skills
I know how to report medical errors. 
SD - SA (5 pt.)
Kaldjian, 
2008
I know what kind of errors should be 
reported.
SD - SA (5 pt.)
Kaldjian, 
2008
THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR QUESTIONNAIRE
The following questions ask about your experience with reporting medical
errors that you were personally involved in or observed.
Medical errors go by many names and can be called events, incidents,
slips, near misses to name a few.
Reporting medical errors refers to either making a formal report to an
incident reporting system or to a supervisor/manager.
2 Past Behavior  
In the past 12 months, how many medical 
errors or “events” have you committed or 
observed?
a) None
b) 1 to 2
c) 3 to 5
d) 6 to 10
e) 11 to 20
f) 21 or more
AHQR  
Section G
In the past 12 months, how many of these 
medical errors or “events” (that you 
personally committed or observed) have you 
reported to an incident reporting system or a 
manager/supervisor? 
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a) No event reports
b) 1 to 2 event reports
c) 3 to 5 event reports
. d)  6 to 10 event reports
. e)  11 to 20 event reports
f) 21 or more event reports
3 Intention to Report Medical Errors: To what extent do you agree with 
the following statements:
I expect that I will report medical errors
SD - SA (5 pt.)
Francis 
(2004)
If a medical error occurs, I want to report it.
SD - SA (5 pt.)
I intend to report medical errors
SD - SA (5 pt.)
4 Attitude (towards the behavior): Overall, I think reporting medical errors 
is
Good - Bad Practice (Overall evaluation) Francis 
(2004)
Harmful - Beneficial (Instrumental)
Pleasant (for me) - Unpleasant (Experiential)
Worthless - Useful (Instrumental)
4 Subjective Norms: To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements:
Injunctive Most people who are important to me think 
that I should report medical errors
SD - SA (5 pt.)
Ajzen; 
Francis 
(2004)
Injunctive It is expected of me that I report medical 
errors
SD - SA (5 pt.)
Injunctive I feel under social pressure to report medical 
errors
SD - SA (5 pt.)
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Descriptive Most people like me report medical errors
SD - SA (5 pt.)
4 Perceived Behavioral Control: To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements:
Self-efficacy I am confident that I could report a medical 
error if I wanted to
SD - SA (5 pt.)
Francis 
(2004)  
Self-efficacy For me to report a medical error is
Easy - Difficult (5 pt.)
Controllability The decision to report a medical error is 
beyond my control
SD - SA (5 pt.)
Controllability Whether I report a medical error or not was 
entirely up to me
SD - SA (5 pt.)
7 Psychological Safety
The following questions ask about your team or unit. This refers to the people in 
your work area, department, or clinical area where you spend most of your work 
time or provide most of your clinical services.
To what extent do you agree with the following statements:
If you make a mistake on my team, it is 
often held against you
SD - SA (5 pt.)
Edmondson
(1999)
Reverse 
scored
Members of my team are able to bring up 
problems and tough issues
SD - SA (5 pt.)
People on my team sometimes reject others 
for being different
SD - SA (5 pt.)
Reverse 
scored
It is safe to take a risk on my team
SD - SA (5 pt.)
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It is difficult to ask other members of my 
team for help
SD - SA (5 pt.)
Reverse 
scored
No one on my team would deliberately act in 
a way that undermines my efforts
SD - SA (5 pt.)
My unique skills and talents are valued and 
utilized while working with members of my 
team
SD - SA (5 pt.)
1         Patient Safety Grade 
Please give your work area/unit an overall 
grade on patient safety based on the past 12 
months.
Excellent (A) – Failing (F) (5 pt.)
AHRQ 
(2004)
Section 
E1
3 Communication Openness
At my place of work, staff will freely speak 
up if they see something that may negatively 
affect patient care.
Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Most of the time, 
Always (5 pt.)
At my place of work, staff feel free to 
question the decision or actions of those with 
more authority.
Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Most of the time, 
Always (5 pt.)
At my place of work, staff are afraid to ask 
questions when something does not seem 
right
Negatively 
worded
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Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Most of the time, 
Always (5 pt.)
SECTION II
CASE STUDIES
http://www.umt.edu/bioethics/healthcare/goals/Articles/manual.pdf
The following case studies are actual cases that occurred in hospitals across
Montana as part of a national study. These cases were developed in
collaboration with Rush Medical College and contain all pertinent
information.
After reading each scenario, you will be asked to decide if an error occurred
and whether or not the scenario warrants reporting to the proper authority,
such as an Incident Reporting System or a supervisor/manager.
Please Note: All cases present issues related to patient safety and may or
may not contain errors. There are 6 case studies.
Case #1
A physician ordered 10 units of insulin for a diabetic patient; the nurse interpreted 
the order as 20 units.
Did an error occur?
a) Yes
b) Maybe
c) No
Would you report this to the appropriate authority such as an Incident 
Reporting System or supervisor/manager?
a) Definitely yes
b) Probably yes
c) Might or might not
d) Probably not
e) Definitely not
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Do you think your colleagues would report this case to the appropriate 
authority such as an Incident Reporting System or supervisor/manager?
a) Definitely yes
b) Probably yes
c) Might or might not
d) Probably not
e) Definitely not
Case #2
An 83-year old male was diagnosed with atrial fibrillation and was admitted to the 
hospital for evaluation. His heart rate was controlled, he was started on Heparin 
and Coumadin, and when his INR reached a value of 2.5, he was discharged on a 
Coumadin dose of 5 mg/day. No follow-up lab tests were done or ordered before 
the patient's scheduled visit to the clinic in 3 weeks. He came to ER one day 
before the scheduled visit with an INR of 14.7 and pain from an expanding 
spontaneous hematoma of his thigh.
Did an error occur?
a) Yes
b) Maybe
c) No
Would you report this to the appropriate authority such as an Incident 
Reporting System or supervisor/manager?
a) Definitely yes
b) Probably yes
c) Might or might not
d) Probably not
e) Definitely not
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Do you think your colleagues would report this case to the appropriate 
authority such as an Incident Reporting System or supervisor/manager?
a) Definitely yes
b) Probably yes
c) Might or might not
d) Probably not
e) Definitely not
Case #3
Mrs. Jenkins was admitted with diagnoses including diabetes, significant renal 
disease, hypertension, blindness, and an infection in her foot. Her physician 
cultured the foot wound and, after receiving the sensitivity report, ordered several 
antibiotics including “Gentamicin Sulfate 60 mg IV q. 40 h.” The nurse caring for 
Mrs. Jenkins wondered what the doctor meant by “q. 40 h” but he hadn’t noted 
anything unusual. She assumed he meant every 4 hours and was using a common 
symbol, the superscript 0, to mean hours. She also expected that the ward clerk 
would clarify the order since the physician was still at the nurses’ station and so 
when she took the order off the chart and entered it on the medication sheet, the 
order read q. 4 h.
The pharmacist believed the order for q. 4 h. had been clarified with the MD. 
Finally, the first nurse to give the medication assumed that the prescription was 
filled correctly. Subsequent nurses did not go back to the original order in the 
chart (q. 40 h) and assumed that the q 4 h, listed on the medication sheet, was
correct. Mrs. Jenkins received Gentamicin 60 mg IV six times daily for three 
days, instead of every 40 hours as was intended due to her renal insufficiency. She 
suffered a permanent loss of approximately 90% of her hearing.
Did an error occur?
a) Yes
b) Maybe
c) No
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Would you report this to the appropriate authority such as an Incident 
Reporting System or supervisor/manager?
a) Definitely yes
b) Probably yes
c) Might or might not
d) Probably not
e) Definitely not
Do you think your colleagues would report this case to the appropriate 
authority such as an Incident Reporting System or supervisor/manager?
a) Definitely yes
b) Probably yes
c) Might or might not
d) Probably not
e) Definitely not
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CASE #4:
An 83-year-old man has a total knee replacement and is put on Coumadin. Two 
days after surgery he is noted to have a delirium. Its cause is presumed to be post-
op and may be secondary to pain medications. Several nurses’ notes reveal that he 
seems worse after getting Vicodin. However, he begins to clear over the following 
week, but occasional notes in his chart reveal that he is oriented X 2; once X3. His 
neurology exam is normal. 
He is sent to the rehab program. Since improvement is slow, however, he is 
discharged from the rehab unit and re-admitted to the hospital. Two days after this 
admission, he falls and bumps his head. His INR is 1.5-1.9. However, a 
neurologist notes that he has no LOC, or head ache and his physical exam is 
normal. The patient is followed daily and closely by multiple providers; all say he 
is oriented to time, person, and place and no focal neurological deficits are noted. 
Several notes say: "no need for a CT scan as his exam remains normal".
Since his family members think the at the hospital environment may be impeding 
his recovery, they want him to go home to normal surroundings for a time. PT/OT 
staff do not think he should be discharged; they are concerned about the risk of a 
fall and believe he should be watched 24 hour/day. The medical team agrees to the 
family’s requests and the patient is discharged.
Three days after his return home he is noted to be "dull and weak." He is taken to 
an ED and they find a large subdural hematoma with herniation. The patient dies.
Did an error occur?
a) Yes
b) Maybe
c) No
Would you report this to the appropriate authority such as an Incident 
Reporting System or supervisor/manager?
a) Definitely yes
b) Probably yes
c) Might or might not
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d) Probably not
e) Definitely not
Do you think your colleagues would report this case to the appropriate 
authority such as an Incident Reporting System or supervisor/manager?
a) Definitely yes
b) Probably yes
c) Might or might not
d) Probably not
e) Definitely not
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CASE #5
Karen Anderson had been diagnosed with congestive heart failure for many years. 
She took a number of medications including a ACE (angiotensin converting 
enzyme) inhibitor, beta blockers to slow progression of the heart failure and 
improve survival, diuretics to treat the fluid overload, and digoxin for control of 
her symptoms. In addition, she took a potassium supplement. Mrs. Anderson was 
82 years old, thin, and lived alone. She was hospitalized in the morning after 
seeing her doctor for increased shortness of breath. Her physical exam revealed 
rales, swollen ankles, and a 6-pound increase in weight. Dr. Mason ordered a one-
time dose of Lasix 20mg IV on admission followed by a lab draw to check 
electrolytes two hours later.
The nurse who assumed care of Mrs. Anderson had a heavy patient load that day. 
She gave the Lasix four hours after Mrs. Anderson arrived and after the lab had 
drawn the blood for the electrolyte panel. When Dr. Mason came in at 4 pm to 
check on Mrs. Anderson, she noted the lab report indicated that the potassium
level was low. Dr. Mason assumed that the blood was drawn after Mrs. Anderson 
had received the Lasix. Thus, she ordered 40 mg of potassium and Lasix 20 mg 
IV. The evening nurse noted the orders and decided to give the potassium after
dinner. She gave the Lasix before dinner. 
During dinner, Mrs. Anderson suddenly felt light-headed and called the nurse. She 
lost consciousness and a code was called. She was found to be in ventricular 
tachycardia and successfully converted with lidocaine and transferred to the ICU.
Did an error occur?
a) Yes
b) Maybe
c) No
Would you report this to the appropriate authority such as an Incident 
Reporting System or supervisor/manager?
a) Definitely yes
b) Probably yes
c) Might or might not
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d) Probably not
e) Definitely not
Do you think your colleagues would report this case to the appropriate 
authority such as an Incident Reporting System or supervisor/manager?
a) Definitely yes
b) Probably yes
c) Might or might not
d) Probably not
e) Definitely not
Case #6
A physician ordered a patient to be started on a heparin drip. The nurse pulled the 
weight-based standing orders and had the MD identify the loading dose and rate 
per hour to run the heparin drip. By policy the facility requires that all heparin 
orders must be double-checked by another licensed professional before the 
medication is given to the patient. The RN drew up the loading dose and the 
amount needed to mix the heparin drip (20,000 units in 1 liter of NS).
All of this was completed per protocol. The nurse gave the bolus and initiated the 
heparin drip. At the bedside the nurse inadvertently set the pump at the wrong rate 
and did not discover the error until the 6-hour post heparin infusion PTT was due. 
The patient's INR and PTT were at panic values. The patient subsequently needed 
Vitamin K and fresh frozen plasma.
Did an error occur?
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a) Yes
b) Maybe
c) No
Would you report this to the appropriate authority such as an Incident 
Reporting System or supervisor/manager?
a) Definitely yes
b) Probably yes
c) Might or might not
d) Probably not
e) Definitely not
Do you think your colleagues would report this case to the appropriate 
authority such as an Incident Reporting System or supervisor/manager?
a) Definitely yes
b) Probably yes
c) Might or might not
d) Probably not
e) Definitely not
(Optional) Comments regarding this or any of the previous case studies
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